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INTRODUCTION

Ever since the Supreme Court's invalidation of racially segregated
public schools in Brown v. Board of Education,1 America has wrestled
with the challenge of successfully dismantling educational apartheid.
In recent years, the federal judiciary has largely retreated from en
forcing desegregation in school districts that were once under court
supervision for engaging in intentional racial discrimination, finding
that the vestiges of past discrimination have been satisfactorily amelio
rated.2 In some such unitary school districts,3 as well as in districts in
* The author would like to thank Professor Roderick M. Hills, Jr., for his assistance.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I].
2. See Tamar Lewin, Public Schools Confronting Issue of Racial Preferences, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, § 1, at 1 (noting that the "desegregation orders imposed by the courts
decades ago are [being] lifted in more and more areas," including "Nashville, Oklahoma
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which no intentional segregation was ever identified by the courts,
boards of education. have voluntarily4 implemented student assign
ment plans5 designed to increase racial. diversity. Many of these plans,
particularly those explicitly relying on individual racial classifications,
have come under legal attack as unconstitutional violations of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 In the ab
sence of clear Supreme Court precedent on the matter,7 federal courts
have struggled with the question of what role, if any, racial classifica�
tions may constitutionally play in the assignment of public school stu
dents.

City, Denver, Wilmington, Del., and Cleveland"). The desegregation decree has also re
cently been lifted in Louisville, Kentucky. See Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
102 F. Supp. 2d 358 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
3. A "unitary" school district is one that "has eliminated the vestiges of its prior dis
crimination and has been adjudicated as such through the proper judicial procedures." Bd.
of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 245 (1991) (quoting Georgia State Conference Branches of
NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1413 n.12 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). In other words, a school district found by the federal judiciary to have operated a
"dual," or segregated, school system remains under court order to remedy this discrimina
tion until the judiciary ultimately concludes that judicial supervision is no longer constitu
tionally required. At this point, when the school district is freed of court supervision, it is
considered "unitary."
In Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968), the Court listed six factors to
be used by lower courts in determining whether a school district had achieved unitary status:
student attendance patterns, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and fa
cilities. See also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 u�s. 467, 486 (1992) (discussing these "Green factors").
In Freeman, the Court held that a district court may find a school district unitary with regard
to some of the Green factors, and not to others, and thereby "return control to the school
system in those areas where compliance has been achieved, limiting further judicial supervi
sion to operations that are not yet in full compliance with the court decree.�' Id. at 491. Since
this Note focuses on the Green factor of student attendance patterns, it will use the term
"unitary" to refer to school districts that have been declared "unitary" at least with respect to
this factor alone. More generally, it will use the term "unitary" to refer to any school district
that is not currently under a court order to desegregate, regardless of whether the school
district ever was under such an order.
4. This Note uses the term "voluntary" to distinguish between uses of racial classifica
tions adopted by a state actor under no court order to remedy past discrimination and those
imposed by a federal court, which, of course, must logically be constitutional when adopted.
See Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 233 F.3d 232, 274 (4th Cir. 2000) ("[C]ourt
ordered remedial action cannot be found violative of the Constitution."), vacated and reh'g
en bane granted (4th Cir. Jan. 17, 2001) (on file with author); cf Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.").
5. This Note uses the term "student assignment plan" to mean the process by which the
public school district distributes its students among the district's schools.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (forbidding a State from "deny[ing] to any person . . .
the equal protection of the laws").
7. See Lewin, supra note 2, at 1 ("[T]he question of whether the educational value of
diversity justifies race-conscious policies in public schools is an open one, never directly ad
dressed by the United States Supreme Court."); see also Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 378
("The Supreme Court has never considered, however, whether educational diversity could
be a compelling goal of public secondary education.").
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The modem history of racial classifications and public education
begins with Brown. While in the immediate aftermath of Brown the
Court remained deliberately ambiguous in prescribing precisely how
the system of school segregation was to be dismantled,8 many observ
ers believed the Brown Court to have endorsed a principle of govern
mental race-neutrality, or "colorblindness," in declaring separate-but
equal schools unconstitutional, thereby outlawing only those forms of
de jure segregation9 that explicitly discriminated.10 The ineffectiveness
8. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II] (ordering
the federal district courts to issue decrees and orders desegregating the public schools in the
South "with all deliberate speed").
9. De jure discrimination is intentional discrimination by the state, which may take the
form of laws explicitly discriminating against racial and ethnic minorities, but may also exist
in the form of race-neutral laws enacted with a discriminatory purpose or administered in a
discriminatory way. WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1182 (8th ed.
1996). De facto segregation, on the other hand, describes segregation that is not the result of
any purposeful government action. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973)
("[T]he differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segrega
tion ... is purpose or intent to segregate.").
Southern and some near- Southern states generally used explicitly discriminatory laws to
effectuate segregation. See Brown /, 347 U. S. 483, 486 n.l (1954) (noting that Delaware,
Virginia, and South Carolina all had state constitutional provisions and statutes that re
quired the segregation of blacks and whites in public schools; Kansas had a statute that per
mitted, but did not require, segregation). Such explicitly discriminatory schemes were un
doubtedly declared unconstitutional in Brown. If Brown only required facial colorblindness,
however, then de jure discrimination in the form of race-neutral policies enacted with a dis
criminatory purpose would be valid. It was not until 1973, in Keyes, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), that
the Supreme Court made clear that race-neutral de jure discrimination - accomplished
through school construction, gerrymandering attendance zones, and excessive use of mobile
classroom units - amounted to unconstitutional segregation.
10. For instance, the Attorney General's brief to the Court noted that in communities
where residential segregation existed, the abolition of segregation in schools would produce
few serious dislocations, and virtually no wholesale transfer of students. See John N.
Popham, Segregation: South Looks Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1954, at 4E (quoting brief).
The Attorney General's offiee, at least in 1953, therefore, thought that desegregation meant the
mere requirement of colorblindness, not the pursuit of affirmative race-conscious measures of
integration. See id. ("[The lack of wholesale transfers after desegregation would result] from
purely geographic factors, because the pupils of a school ordinarily reflect the composition of
the population of the district in which it is located." (quoting brief) (internal quotations omit
ted)). A New York Times editorial within a week of Brown extolled the decision as finally
establishing the rule of colorblindness advocated by Justice Harlan in his famous dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), in which he stated, "In re
spect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the Constitution of the United States does not, I
think, permit any public authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected in the en
joyment of such rights." See Editorial, Justice Harlan Concurring, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1954, at
lOE. In Brown II the Court itself seemed to be requiring only governmental race-neutrality
when it mandated that all black students be "admit[ted] to public schools on a racially nondis
criminatory basis." Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
Nine years after Brown, President John F. Kennedy also viewed the decision as validat
ing Harlan's proposed rule of colorblindness. See John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television
Report to the American People on Civil Rights, PUB. PAPERS 468, 471 (June 11, 1963) [here
inafter Kennedy, Radio and Television Report] (stating that "the Negro community . . . ha[s]
a right to expect that the law will be fair, that the constitution will be color blind, as Justice
Harlan said at the tum of the century"); see also John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the
Congress on Civil Rights, 6 PUB. PAPERS 221, 221 (Feb. 28, 1963) (quoting approvingly
Justice Harlan's assertion that "Our Constitution is color blind"). Indeed, Kennedy viewed
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of mere colorblindness, however, in achieving meaningful school inte
gration within the first fourteen years after Brown led the Court to
endorse, and often require, race-consciousness as a method of accom
plishing desegregation.11 As a result, beginning with the seminal 1968
Green v. County School Board decision, the Court clarified the Brown
desegregation mandate as charging school boards "with the affirma
tive duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch."12 In 1971, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, the Court again made clear that merely facially race
neutral student assignment plans were not necessarily sufficient to
remedy the constitutional injury in formerly de jure segregated school
districts.13
Green and Swann, therefore, held that not only was race a permis
sible factor in student assignment, but that, at least in school districts
found to have engaged in de jure discrimination, considerations of
race, including racial classifications, were sometimes required.14

the Court's decision in Brown and subsequent cases nullifying segregation as affirming the
proposition that "race has no place in American life or law." Kennedy, Radio and Television
Report, supra, at 469.
11. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968) (holding that the formerly
segregated New Kent County's "freedom-of-choice" plan, which allowed students to choose
whether to attend the formerly all-black school or the formerly all-white school (and was,
therefore, nominally race-neutral), had merely maintained the unconstitutional status quo of
segregation).
12. Green, 391 U. S. at 437-38; see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 472 (1992) (de
scribing Green as a "turning point" in the Court's desegregation jurisprudence).
13. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971), ("'Racially
neutral' assignment plans proposed by school authorities to a district court may be inade
quate.... (A]n assignment plan is not acceptable simply because it appears to be neutral.").
Specifically, Swann approved of the "frank - and sometimes drastic - gerrymandering of
school district and attendance zones," even when these zones were "neither compact nor
contiguous," in an effort "to accomplish the transfer of Negro students out of formerly seg
regated Negro schools and transfer of white students to formerly all-Negro schools." Id. at
27 (footnote omitted). In other words, Swann explicitly approved intradistrict transportation
- or "busing," as the practice became commonly known - as: a desegregation remedy
within the equitable discretion of a district court. See MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATION
POLICY AND THE LAW 495-96 (3d ed. 1992).
Swann also approved of an "optional majority-to-minority transfer provision" under
which those in the racial majority at a particular school would be allowed to transfer to a
school where they would be in the minority. Swann, 402 U.S. at 26-27.
14. Exactly how race was to be used, whether through explicit racial classifications of
individual students or through facially neutral - but race-conscious - student assignment
plans like busing, is not entirely clear in Swann. The Court clearly held the latter to be per
missible, see supra note 13, but it seemed hesitant to endorse unequivocally the former. The
Court noted that had the district court "require[ d], as a matter of substantive constitutional
right, any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that approach would be disapproved
and we would be obliged to reverse." Swann, 402 U.S. at 24. But the Court's approval of the
"majority-to-minority transfer provision," see supra note 13 - a plan that would necessarily
require classifying individual students by race - indicated its approval of at least some uses
of racial classifications by district courts in fashioning their remedies.
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Extrapolating from the Court's approval of race-consciousness in the
context of remedying de jure discrimination, lower federal courts in
the 1970s generally assumed, in the absence of Supreme Court prece
dent directly on point, that the voluntary use of racial classifications by
unitary school districts for student assignment was constitutionally
permissible.15 In doing so, these courts often cited Chief Justice
Burger's influential dictum in Swann:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formu
late and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for ex
ample, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society
each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students re
flecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educa
tional policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authori

. . . . 16
In applying this dictum, the courts offered two interrelated compelling
interests to justify the government's use of racial classifications, even
under strict scrutiny. The first was the state's interest in preventing de
facto segregation of its schools resulting from changing demographic
patterns like white flight.17 The second, related justification was the
state's interest in an integrated learning environment for its students, a
justification akin to the "diversity" rationale recognized in Justice
Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.18
Although the Supreme Court approved of the use of racial classifi
cations to remedy de jure segregation in public education,19 and lower
federal courts went so far as to approve of the voluntary use of racial
classifications to achieve public school integration,2° at around the
ties

Furthermore, in applying the Court's desegregation jurisprudence, lower federal courts
used racial classifications routinely and extensively, assuming them to be constitutionally
permissible remedies for school districts found guilty of de jure segregation. See, e.g., San
Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F. Supp. 34, 53-54 (N.D. Cal.
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 896 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1990).
15. See Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 604 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated mem.,
449 U. S. 915 (1980); Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705,
713-14 (2d Cir. 1979); Higgins v. Bd. of Educ. of Grand Rapids, 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974).
16. See Johnson, 604 F.2d at 514 (quoting Swann, 402 U. S. at 16).
17. See id. at 516-17 (upholding Chicago's use of racial quotas as "a necessary means of
arresting de facto segregation in the public schools"); Ambach, 598 F.2d at 720 ("(W]e may
in the limited circumstances of purely voluntary action, accept the probability of white flight
as a factor which the (School] Board was entitled to take into account in the integration
equation.").
18. 438 U. S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); see Johnson, 604 F.2d at 514 (describing
as "well-settled" the powers of a local school board to "voluntarily adopt plans . . . to pro
mote integration," citing Swann's dictum). For further discussion of the distinction between
the state's interest in diversity and the state's interest in preventing de facto segregation, see
infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 14.
20. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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same time a conflicting body of jurisprudence was developing that ex
pressed skepticism toward the government's use of racial classifica
tions in any context. The Court had announced its discomfort with ra
cial classifications as far back as the 1940s, in Korematsu v. United
States21 and Hirabayashi v. United States.22 While some might have
thought that the Court's discomfort in Korematsu and Hirabayashi
was based solely on the fact that the government was using racial clas
sifications to oppress a racial minority,23 Justice Powell's 1978 Bakke
opinion24 announced strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of re
view for any governmental policies relying on racial classifications, in
cluding those intended to benefit rather than oppress historically dis
advantaged groups.25
Although Justice Powell's opinion for the Court ultimately found
the state's interest in educational diversity to be sufficiently compel
ling to justify a limited use of racial classifications by an institution of
higher learning in its admissions policies,26 the decision laid the foun
dation for subsequent opinions, such as City of Richmond v. J.A.

21. 323 U. S. 21 4, 216 (19 4 4 ) ("It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. .. . [C]ourts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.").
22. 320 U.S. 81, 100 (19 43 ) ("Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ances
try are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality. . . . (R]acial discriminations are in most circumstances irrelevant and
therefore prohibited . . . .").
·

23. Indeed, in 1938, in its famous Carolene Products footnote 4, the Court had noted
that "the review of statutes directed at particular religious or national or racial minorities . . .
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 30 4 U.S. 1 4 4, 153 n. 4 (citations omitted ).
2 4. Although Justice Powell authored a lone opinion, four other Justices concurred on
narrower grounds. See Bakke, 438 U. S. at 415, 417-18 ( Stevens, J., concurring in the judg
ment in part and dissenting in part ) (construing the applicable statute, Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 196 4, to require "colorblind"-ness without deciding the "congruence - or lack
of congruence - of the controlling statute and the Constitution").
25. See id. at 291 (opinion of Powell, J. ) ("Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are
inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination." (emphasis
added ) (citing Hirabayashi and Korematsu)) . A majority of the Court rejected the univer
sity's argument that racial or ethnic classifications that disadvantage groups, like white
males, who are not "discrete and insular minorit(ies)" should not be subjected to strict judi
cial scrutiny because no "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process"is
required. Id. at 290 (opinion of Powell, J. ) (quoting Carolene Prods. , 30 4 U. S. at 153 n. 4 (in
ternal quotation marks omitted ) ).
Bakke involved a state medical school admissions program that evaluated minority ap
plicants in a separate applicant pool and reserved a number of admissions slots for minori
ties. Id. at 273-7 4 (opinion of Powell, J. ). Using strict scrutiny, Bakke rejected the state's as
serted remedial justification for its admissions policy since there. had been no identified
pattern of discrimination perpetrated by the medical school. Id. at 308-09 (opinion of
Powell, J. ). The state's asserted interest in remedying general "societal discrimination" "an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past" - was not
considered compelling.See 438 U.S. at 307.
26. See id. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J. )
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Croson Co.21 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,28 that have cast
serious doubt on the constitutionality of any governmental program
that relies on racial classifa;ations.29 In particular, the Court has indi
cated its disapproval of government schemes that treat otherwise
similarly situated individuals differently solely because of their race.30
As Professor Jed Rubenfeld has observed, the Croson and Adarand
opinions announced a doctrine of "classificationism," under which
"[t]he [racial] classification itself is the constitutionally suspect feature
of the law, the feature that triggers heightened scrutiny," regardless of
any allegedly benign legislative motive.31 The Court's rigid "classifica
tionism" in its post-Bakke opinions has led some lower federal courts
to question the continued precedential vitality of Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke, concluding that even in the context of higher educa-

27. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In Croson, the Court considered the constitutionality of
Richmond's municipal minority set-aside plan, which required non-minority-owned prime
contractors awarded city construction contracts to set aside a percentage of their subcon
tracts to minority-owned businesses. Id. at 477-78. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court con
cluded that the Richmond plan was not narrowly tailored to achieve the city's asserted inter
est of remedying past discrimination. Id. at 506.
28. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). In Adarand, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a fed
eral subcontractor compensation clause that gave prime contractors a financial incentive to
hire minority subcontractors. Id. at 205-06. A white subcontractor sued, claiming that he lost
out on a subcontract he would have received but for the financial incentives offered by the
federal compensation program. Id. at 210. Although the Court did not actually engage in the
strict scrutiny analysis, remanding this task to the appellate court, id. at 237, it made clear
that courts should always take a "skeptical view" of a government classification based on
race, "which 'so seldom provide[s] a relevant basis for disparate treatment.' " Id. at 228 (al
teration in original) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutzuick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 (1980) ( Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
29. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 ("[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to de
mand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification
subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny."); Croson,
488 U.S. at 493-94 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (noting that "the standard of review
under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or bene
fited by a particular classification," and that the single standard of review for racial classifica
tions is "strict scrutiny"); Id. at 520 ( Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[S]trict scrutiny
must be applied to all governmental classification by race . . . ."); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.) ("[T]he level of scrutiny does
not change merely because the challenged classification operates against a group that his
torically has not been subject to governmental discrimination.").
30. See Adarand, 515 U. S. at 224 ("[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to de
mand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification
subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny."); see also
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 941 (5th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Hopwood I] (describing the
Court's Adarand approach as recognizing that Fourteenth Amendment rights are "personal
rights," "guaranteed to the individual" (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 22 (1948)
(internal quotation marks omitted))); id. ("[T]he Court consistently has rejected arguments
conferring benefits on a person based solely upon his membership in a specific [racial] class
of persons.'').
31. Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 433-34 (1997).
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tion diversity is not a sufficiently compelling interest to overcome the
general suspicion of racial classifications.32

32. In Hopwood v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit struck down the University of Texas Law
School's admissions program, which gave preference to applicants from certain specified mi
nority groups, concluding that the law school may not use race as a factor in admissions.
Hopwood /; 78 F.3d at 935; see also Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2000)
[hereinafter Hopwood II] (declining, on law-of-the-case grounds, to overturn the original
Hopwood holding that diversity is not a compelling government interest as the ruling "did
not rise to the level of clear error"), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3702 (U.S. June 25, 2001) (No.
00-1609). In doing so, the Hopwood court observed that Croson and Adarand indicate that
diversity is not an interest sufficiently compelling to justify racial classifications; only "reme
dying past wrongs" may suffice. Hopwood I, 78 F.3d at 944-45.
In a recent decision striking down the University of Georgia's admissions policy for un
constitutionally awarding bonus points to nonwhite applicants, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that Justice Powell's Bakke opinion was not binding precedent.
See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19154, at *37
(11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001) ("Simply put, Justice Powell's opinion does not establish student
body diversity as a compelling interest for the purposes of this case."); id. at *38 ("We think
it clear that the status of student body diversity as a compelling interest justifying racial pref
erence in university admissions is an open question in the Supreme Court and in our
Court."). The court nevertheless assumed that diversity was a compelling interest for the
purposes of its opinion, but proceeded to find that the university's use of racial preferences
in its admission policy was not narrowly tailored to achieve diversity. Id. at *82.
In another recent case striking down the University of Michigan Law School's admis
sions policy, a federal district court agreed with the Hopwood court and found that Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke was no longer good law. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821,
849 (E.D. Mich. 2001) ("The court concludes that the Supreme Court in Bakke did not rec
ognize the achievement of racial diversity in university admissions as a compelling state in
ter�st. "). The Grutter court also concluded that even assuming arguendo that Powell's Bakke
opinion were controlling, the law school's admissions policy could not be justified as "nar
rowly tailored." Id. at 850. The case, along with a companion case challenging the University
of Michigan's undergraduate admissions policy's use of race, Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp.
2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000), is currently pending appeal to the Sixth Circuit.
Other circuits have expressed skepticism as to whether diversity may serve as a compel
ling government interest, albeit in different contexts. See Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod v.
FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (opining that the government's interest in "diversity
can[not] be elevated to the 'compelling' level" in the context of broadcasting); see also Belk
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 233 F.3d 232, 309 n.13. (4th Cir. 2000) (Traxler, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that in the Fourth Circuit "it is unsettled
whether diversity may be a compelling state interest"), vacated and reh'g en bane granted
(4th Cir. Jan. 17, 2001); McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998)
(observing that the question of whether there may be compelling interests
. other than remedying past discrimination remains "unsettled"), 525 U.S. 981 a998).
Reports of Bakke's death, however, may be both exaggerated and premature. In con
trast to the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood decision, two recent federal court decisions have relied
on Justice Powell's Bakke opinion to uphold university affirmative action policies that take
account of an applicant's race. In Smith v. University of Washington, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir.
2000) , cert. denied, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4011 (U.S. May 29, 2001) (No. 00-1341), the Ninth
Circuit upheld the University of Washington Law School's affirmative action policy, declin
ing to join the Fifth Circuit in finding Bakke to have been implicitly overruled. Id. at 12001201, ("We, therefore, leave it to the Supreme Court to declare that the Bakke rationale re
garding university admissions policies has become moribund, if it has. We will not."). Simi
larly, in Gratz, the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan upheld the
University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions program that relied on racial classifica
tions, also concluding that Bakke remains good law. Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 824 (noting
that "diversity, in the context of higher education, constitutes a compelling governmental
interest").
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The increased judicial suspicion of racial classifications has re
cently filtered down to the level of public elementary and secondary
schools, with courts now reconsidering the once-settled notion that a
unitary school district may voluntarily use racial classifications to pur
sue the related goals of increasing educational diversity and reducing
de facto segregation within the district's schools.33 In reviewing these
policies, courts are faced with two seemingly contradictory constitu
tional imperatives: on the one hand, the Supreme Court has approved
of racial classifications as a tool to remedy de jure segregation; on the
other hand, the Court has grown increasingly suspicious of any gov
ernmental use of racial classifications.34
This Note attempts to provide an answer to this dilemma and ex
plain what steps unitary public school districts may or may not take to
increase diversity and reduce de facto segregation.35 It argues that the
33. See Lewin, supra note 2 ("[T]he longstanding debate over affirmative action in edu
cation, for years centered on universities and professional schools, is shifting down to public
school districts, where an increasing number of parents - mostly white - are complaining
about policies they say are unfair to their children.").
34. See Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 379 (W.D. Ky.
2000) ("It is incongruous that a federal court could at one moment require a school board to
use race to prevent resegregation of the system, and at the very next moment prohibit that
same policy.").
35. This Note focuses on the diversity and prevention-of-de-facto-segregation justifica
tions for racial classifications and does not address the constitutionality of remedial justifica
tions offered to support a unitary school district's use of racial classifications. Although
lower courts themselves have required school districts to use racial classifications when is
.
suing decrees to cure identified discrimination within a school district found to have segre
gated, see supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text, they have been quite skeptical of reme
dial justifications for racial classifications in unitary districts, see, e.g. , Wessmann v. Gittens,
160 F.3d 790, 800 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting school's assertion that its use of racial classifica
tions could be justified "as a means of redressing the vestiges of past discrimination"). This
skepticism has been based on the Supreme Court's rigid requirements of identified discrimi
nation to justify the remedial use of racial classifications, which have made it highly unlikely
that a unitary school district is likely to succeed in defending its racial classifications on re
medial grounds, see Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-508 (requiring detailed evidentiary findings of
past discrimination for remedial justification to survive strict scrutiny), despite the contrary
views of some commentators and judges, see, e.g. , Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 810 (Lipez, J., dis
senting) (accepting school board's remedial argument); Recent Case, 1 12 HARV. L. REV.
1789, 1792-93 (1999) (arguing that the First Circuit erred in rejecting remedial justification in
Wessmann). Furthermore, while the lower courts have split on the precedential value of
Bakke's diversity justification, they have been more uniform in rejecting the state's interest
in remedying discrimination as a sufficiently weighty justification for using racial classifica
tions. See, e.g. , MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13, 21-22 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(finding that an FCC rule requiring broadcasters to increase minority recruitment was not
narrowly tailored to achieve the government's asserted interest in. remedying discrimina
tion); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 151-52 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding a remedial race
based scholarship unconstitutional); Md. Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1074 (4th
Cir. 1993) (holding a remedial hiring program unconstitutional).
Indeed, almost all of the schools whose voluntary integration plans have come under
legal attack in recent years have trumpeted the diversity or prevention of de facto segrega
tion rationales to justify their use of racial classifications, and most have done so exclusively,
not even bothering to assert remedial justifications; additionally, none have relied exclu
sively on the remedial justification. See Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d
738 (2d Cir. 2000) (prevention of de facto segregation); Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v.
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Court's recent skepticism toward racial classifications means that clas
sifications may play only a narrow role in student assignment plans.
Nevertheless, race-conscious race-neutral student assignment plans that is, facially colorblind programs enacted with the intention of in
creasing racial diversity - can be both a constitutional and effective
method of integrating public schools.
Part I analyzes "selective" public schools where admission is com
petitive and determined by merit and argues that the vast majority of
racial classifications in these schools' admissions programs is unconsti
tutional. Because selective schools, with their competitive admissions
processes, are more similar to the higher education context discussed
in Bakke, many courts have concluded that a selective school may only
use race as a "plus" in admissions decisions36 in the manner permitted
by Justice Powell's Bakke opinion.37 In "nonselective" schools, how
ever, where merit is not a factor in admission, some courts have con
cluded that schools have the authority to use race in a less nuanced
fashion.38 Because courts have tended to treat selective and nonselec
tive schools differently, this Note analyzes nonselective schools sepaMontgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999) (diversity and prevention of de
facto segregation), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2000) (per curiam); Tuttle v. Arlington
County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (diversity), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1050
(2000); Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 796 (diversity and remedial justification); Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1235 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (diversity and
curing de facto segregation); Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 378 (diversity and prevention of
de facto segregation); Comfort ex rel. Neumyet v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 100 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.
Mass. 2000) (diversity and prevention of de facto segregation); Equal Open Enrollment
Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 937 F. Supp. 700, 704 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (prevention of de jure segrega
tion). But see Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999) (educa
tional research), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 877 (2000).
36. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.) (concluding that "race or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular appli
cant's file," so long as "it does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other
candidates for the available seats").
37. See, e.g., Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 797-800 (applying the framework of Justice Powell's
Bakke opinion to a selective school's admissions policy).
38. See Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 19 F. Supp. 2d 454-55 (D. Md.
1998) (declining to apply the analytical framework of Justice Powell's Bakke opinion to non
selective schools in part because they lack a competitive admissions process). As Part II will
demonstrate, even nonselective public schools lacking a competitive admissions process,
such as magnet schools, may confer unique educational benefits. Some have argued, how
ever, that the fact that admission to these schools is not based on merit, but rather on chance
(through lotteries, etc.), weakens the plaintiff's claim to have suffered harm. In other words,
the argument goes, "Even though you were denied a chance to attend a unique school at
least in part because of your race, you were not denied the chance to attend a unique school
you deserved to attend on the basis of your achievements, so you have not suffered any, or
at least as much, harm." See, e.g. , Note, The Constitutionality ofRace-Conscious Admissions
Programs in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 112 HARV. L. REV. 940, 955-56
(1999) [hereinafter Harvard Note] ("Perhaps most importantly, students being denied ad
mission to elementary and secondary schools often have a lesser claim to be entitled to ad
mission based on 'merit.' "). Although this Note ultimately disagrees with this contention,
this distinction is sufficiently convincing to justify placing the analysis of unique nonselective
public schools in Part II rather than Part I.
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rately, in Part II. Among nonselective schools themselves, courts have
treated differently those schools offering unique educational benefits,
such as magnet schools, and those offering ostensibly equal, or "fungi
ble," educations.39 Consequently, Part II addresses each type of school
separately, concluding that school districts may almost never rely on
racial classifications in the magnet school context, but officials may
rely on racial classifications in assigning students to fungible schools
when done to stem residential white flight. Part III then explains that
despite the substantial constitutional restrictions on school districts'
ability to use racial classifications, districts are permitted to use race
neutral policies to increase diversity. It then explores a number of
these race-conscious, race-neutral policies that may be both practical
and effective in increasing integration in selective and nonselective
schools.
I.

RACIAL CLA S SIFICATION S IN SELECTIVE SCHOOL S

This Part argues that racial classifications may play a very limited
role, at most, in the admissions policies of selective public schools.
Section I.A explains why the same level of scrutiny ought to apply to a
school's use of classifications in furthering diversity as was applied in
Justice Powell's Bakke opinion. Under this approach, the most com
mon uses of racial classifications by selective public schools fail to sur
vive strict scrutiny. While assuming Bakke is good law would seem to
allow for a limited use of racial classifications, the realities of public
school administration make it highly unlikely that such limited use
could ever be practical. Section I.B then explains why the alternative
justification for a selective school's use of racial classifications - pre
venting de facto segregation, as opposed to pursuing diversity in the
Bakke sense of the word - similarly fails to survive strict scrutiny.
Selective schools, therefore, are effectively precluded from relying on
racial classifications in their admissions policies.
A.

The "Diversity" Rationale

The relevance of Bakke is not entirely clear in the public school
context because Bakke addressed the constitutionality of racial classi
fications in medical school, rather than elementary or secondary

39. See, e.g. , Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 380 (concluding that for the purposes of strict
scrutiny analysis, a school district's assignment of a pupil to a fungible school "imposes no
burden and confers no benefit" whereas assignment to a magnet school does); see also Par
ents Involved in Cmty. Sch. , 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (quoting Coalition for Econ. Equity v.
Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 707 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (conclud
ing that assigning students among fungible schools is merely a "reshuffling" and not a
granting of preferences that the state may give to some citizens but not all, and, therefore,
does not "benefit" one group while "harm"-ing another).
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school, admissions.40 Although the facts of Bakke concerned a medical
school admissions policy only, subsequent courts41 and commenta
tors,42 as well as the Bakke opinion itself,43 generally assumed that the
holding of Bakke would apply to all university admissions processes.44
Extending Bakke's prohibition of racial set-asides to the public ele
mentary and secondary school context has not been so generally as
sumed, however, as some courts and commentators have argued that
diversity is an even more compelling justification for racial classifica
tions in elementary and secondary schools than in higher education.45
In particular, the Supreme Court's broad language in Swann46 and
other cases47 has convinced some that the state's interest in diversity in
public schools is more compelling than in the higher education con
text, therefore allowing for a broader use of racial classifications by
public school officials than that allowed in Bakke.48
Although the Court's language in Swann might have indicated a
willingness to afford local school authorities more discretion than their
counterparts in higher education in using racial classifications, Chief
Justice Burger's Swann dictum was written in the context of student
40. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269 (opinion of Powell, J.).
41. See, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1334 (1998) (reading
Bakke as applying to "institution[s] of higher education," meaning a "university or graduate
program" (emphasis added)).
42. See, e.g. , LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-22, at 1529
(2d ed. 1988) ("The [Bakke] Court thus upheld the kind of affirmative action program used
by most American colleges and universities . . . . ").
43. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-19 (opinion of Powell, J.) (discussing "other university
admissions programs," including those of undergraduate colleges).
44. But there is still some doubt as to whether the exact contours of the Bakke analysis
might vary with the type of higher education institution whose admissions policy is being
challenged. For instance, "[t]here is no clearly established law on the issue of whether the
attainment of diversity in the legal profession is a goal that justifies the consideration of race
in law school admissions." Smith, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1335 (emphases added).
45. See Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 751 (2d Cir. 2000)
(noting that Bakke "is not directly on point as it expressed no opinion as to the compelling
interest of reducing racial isolation in elementary public school education"); Comfort ex rel.
Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 100 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 n.12 (D. Mass. 2000) (noting that
"Bakke was premised on assumptions about the unique contribution that people of one
background or another would make to an institution of higher learning"); Harvard Note,
supra note 38, at 950 ("In the' case of elementary and secondary schools, the argument for
applying the diversity rationale is even greater than in the case of higher education:").
46. See supra text accompanying note 16.
47. See, e.g. , Bustop, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 439 U.S. 1380, 1383 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice
1978) (holding that Los Angeles was permitted to engage in an extensive voluntary busing
program that sought to achieve racial balance throughout the school district).
48. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 797 n.3 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[T]he [Boston Pub
lic] School Committee suggests that [Boston Latin]'s status as a secondary school, as op
posed to a university, materially alters the decisional calculus and warrants judicial defer
ence to school officials' determinations anent the racial and ethnic composition of the
student body."); see also sources cited supra note 45.
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assignment among schools of nominally equal caliber. In other words,
did not concern selective schools.49 Selective schools resemble
in many ways the higher education setting in which Bakke was de
cided .. Like the medical school in Bakke, a selective public school con
fers unique educational benefits upon its students, offering an educa
tional experience unlikely to be matched by nonselective public
schools.so Furthermore, rejection by a selective public school is likely
to impose a significant burden on an applicant in a way similar to re
jection by a medical school.st A student denied admission to a selec
tive school may have his chances of being selected by a prestigious
university seriously impaired.s2 Additionally, a student denied admis
sion to a selective school may have invested years of work in attaining
good grades and may have invested time in preparing for a selective
school's entrance examination.s3 Selective schools' admissions proc
esses and unique educational opportunities, therefore, make them
more akin to the institutions of higher learning considered in Bakke
than they are to ordinary, nonselective schools. Consequently, lower
courts reviewing the admissions policies of selective schools have conSwann

49. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 797 n.3 (criticizing the school committee's attempt to
distinguish Bakke through Swann as "rest[ing] on out-of-context dicta" and "entirely unper
suasive").
50. See Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 380-81 (W.D.
Ky. 2000); see also Abby Goodnough, A Plan to Offer High Schoolers Better Choices, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2000 , at Al (describing how New York City's 200 nonselective public schools
pale in comparison to prestigious selective schools like the Bronx High School of Science
and Stuyvesant High); Julian Guthrie, Desegregation vs. Academic Merit, S.F. EXAMINER,
Feb. 15, 1999, at Al (describing San Francisco's selective Lowell High School as "the Har
vard of public schools").
51. See Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 381. Indeed, Justice Powell's Bakke opinion specifi
cally distinguished the case of an elementary or secondary school student bused from his
neighborhood school to a "comparable" school in another neighborhood as "wholly dis
similar" to the harm imposed on an applicant denied admission to a medical school. Bakke,
438 U.S. at 300 n.39 (opinion of Powell, J.).
52. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Elite High School ls a Grueling Exam Away: Putting Dreams
to the Test, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at Al, BS (quoting a student aspiring to attend New
York City's elite Stuyvesant High as saying, "If I don't make it to Stuyvesant, I can't get into
a good college . . . "). Indeed, of Stuyvesant's graduating seniors, 99.9% go on to college. Id.;
see also Julian Guthrie, 50% Drop in Blacks, Latinos at Lowell, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 16,
1999, at Al ("Lowell, which is the only high school in the district to require an admissions
test to gain access, is the top feeder school to UC [University of California] in the state.");
Venise Wagner, Students Oppose Lowell Suit Deal, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 15, 1999, at Dl
("If you have a student from [nonselective San Francisco high school] Thurgood Marshall
and a student from Lowell, and they both have a 4.0, then you take a college like Princeton,
they'll probably take the student from Lowell." (quoting Thurgood Marshall High student)).
53. See Harvard Note, supra note 38, at 955-56 (using this factor to distinguish the
stricter view of the use of race in college admissions from its proposed more lenient view of
the use of race in elementary and secondary school assignment); Bumiller, supra note 52.
(describing the grueling test preparation regimens of those aspiring to attend Stuyvesant).
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eluded that they must abide by Bakke's standards for using race in a
constitutional fashion.s4
Justice Powell's Bakke opinion requires that schools consider race
in admissions in a manner similar to that of the "Harvard Plan" cited
approvingly.ss Under this approach, one's racial. or ethnic category
may be deemed a "plus" in the admissions process, but all students
must be evaluated in the same admissions pool.s6 Race or ethnicity
may serve as one factor among many in illuminating how the particu
lar qualifications of an applicant might add to the diversity of the stu
dent body,s7 but the essence of this approach is that it "treats each ap
plicant as an individual."ss It eschews irrebuttable presumptions as to
whether a student of a particular ethnicity enhances an institution's
diversity, demanding a more nuanced, individualized evaluation in
stead.s9
To comply with Bakke, a selective school must avoid using racial
"set-asides" that are focused solely on ethnic diversity, which, as
Justice Powell's opinion noted, may actually "hinder rather than fur
ther the attainment of genuine diversity."60 Such set-asides were at is
sue in two recent cases addressing selective schools' uses of racial clas
sifications. In Wessmann v. Gitters, the First Circuit struck down an
admissions program to Boston Latin, one of Boston's selective public
high schools, that required the racial composition of one-half of the
incoming students to correspond to the racial composition of those
students taking the entrance examination.61 In a similar, but broader,
case that was ultimately settled before a federal court could rule on
the merits, Ho v. San Francisco Unified School District,62 a group of
Chinese-American plaintiffs challenged San Francisco's student as54. See, e.g. , Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 797-800 (applying the framework of Justice Powell's
Bakke opinion to a selective school's admissions policy). .
55. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (opinion of Powell, J.).
56. Id. (opinion of Powell, J.) ("(R)ace or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in
a particular applicant's file, yet it does not insulate the individual from comparison with all
other candidates for the available seats.").
57. Id. (opinion of Powell, J.) (noting that the "Harvard Plan" approach "is flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications
of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not
necessarily according them the same weight").
58. Id. at 318 (opinion of Powell, J.).
59. See id. at 317 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("The file Of a particular black applicant may be
examined for his potential contribution to diversity without the factor of race being decisive
when compared, for example, with that of an applicant identified as Italian-American if the
latter is thought to exhibit qualities more likely to promote beneficial educational plural
ism.").
60. See id. at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.) (emphasis added).
61. 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir.1998).
62. 147 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 1998).
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signment policy that limited the number of enrollees from a given ra
cial or ethnic group to forty to forty-five percent of the student body.63
In particular, the plaintiffs objected to the policy's effect on the admis
sions program for Lowell High School, San Francisco's premier public
school and the only public school in the city that employed a highly
selective admissions process.64 There, a forty percent cap had the ef
fect of holding Chinese applicants to a higher standard than other mi
nority or white applicants.65 Facing a court that was prepared to review
the school board's racial classifications under a standard of strict scru
tiny,66 . the school district reached a settlement with the plaintiffs that

·

63. The challenged policy was the result of the district's desegregation consent decree
entered into in 1983. See San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F.
Supp. 34, 53 (N.D. Cal. 1983), rev'd, 896 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1990). Because the challenged
policy had been judicially approved, one might have thought it would have been immune to
constitutional challenge. See supra note 4; Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 233
F.3d 232, 249 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that because district's race-classifying student assign
ment plan complied with a court order, it did "not violate the Constitution"), vacated, en
bane (4th cir. Jan. 17, 2001). In other words, until a district is officially declared unitary, it
would seem as if any court-approved action is necessarily constitutional. See id. at 267 (not
ing that because district had yet to be declared unitary, "the Board's obligation to obey . . .
court orders insulates it from constitutional attack for actions taken in compliance with
them").
A litigant may seek to have the school district declared unitary and simultaneously assert
that should unitary status be declared, the district's actions are no longer constitutionally
permissible. See Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. , 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 359-60
(W.D. Ky. 2000). In Ho, however, the litigants did not seek to have the district declared uni
tary per se. Rather, they simply challenged the continued constitutional validity of the par
ticular part of the consent decree ("paragraph 13") that set forth racial and ethnic guidelines
for student assignment. See San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 59 F.
Supp. 2d 1021, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Both the District Court for the Northern District of
California, see id. , and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, see Ho, 147 F.3d 854 (9th
Cir. 1998), recognized this as a legitimate cause of action and did not find the school district's
actions to be insulated from constitutional attack because they had been taken pursuant to a
judicially approved consent decree. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit noted, "The district court
properly ruled that the consent decree of 1983 was res judicata binding the plaintiffs as to the
decree's propriety in 1983, while leaving open the question of the propriety of paragraph 13
today." Id. at 865 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit, therefore, required the defendant
school district to prove why racial classifications could still be justified today even if they
were justified when the consent decree was entered into in 1983, despite the fact that neither
the school district nor the plaintiffs were seeking a judicial declaration of "unitariness." See
id. ("It will also be the task of the School District to demonstrate that paragraph 13 is still a
remedy fitted to a wrong - to show that the racial classifications and quotas employed by
paragraph 13 are tailored to the problems caused by vestiges of the earlier segregation.").
64. See Julian Guthrie, S.F. School Plan Factors in Race, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 28, 1999,
at Al ("The focal point of the lawsuit by the Chinese American families was Lowell High
School, the City's premier academic high school, where an admissions policy based strictly
on entrance exams would produce a student body overwhelmingly Asian."); Selena Dong,
Note, "Too Many Asians": The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination Against Asian
Americans and Preserving Affirmative Action, 47 STAN L. REV. 1027, 1030 n.12 (1995) (cit
ing Nanette Asimov, Students Battle for Admission to Top S.F. School: Lowell High's Ethnic
Limits Stir Charges of Discrimination, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 19, 1993, at A13).
65. See Dong, supra note 64, at 1030 (citing Andrew Leonard, Class Action: Chinese
American Activists Come Out Swinging - but Divided - in the Battle over the SF School
Desegregation Plan, BAY GUARDIAN, Apr. 7, 1993, at 23, 23-24).
66. See Ho, 147 F.3d at 864.
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required that "race or ethnicity may not be the primary or predomi
nant consideration in . . . admission criteria. "67
The First Circuit's decision in Wessmann and the Ninth Circuit's in
Ho recognized that the school districts' use of racial classifications for
evaluating individual applicants to selective public schools ran afoul of
Bakke's norms. By employing a racial set-aside, the Wessmann court
found that the Boston Latin policy did exactly what Justice Powell's
Bakke opinion condemned: "it effectively foreclosed some candidates
from all consideration" for admission to Boston Latin simply because
of their racial or ethnic category.68 Furthermore, the policy's ethnic
guidelines were, as Judge Selya remarked in his opinion for the court,
"less a means of attaining diversity in any constitutionally relevant
sense and more a means for racial balancing. "69 The Boston Latin ad
missions policy, by looking at only test scores and race, focused exclu
sively on racial and ethnic diversity,70 hardly "consider[ing] all ele
ments of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each
applicant," as did the Harvard Plan that Justice Powell endorsed.71
Additionally, by taking into account only five ethnic groups, and doing
so in a yes-no, check-box fashion, the Boston Latin policy violated
Bakke's denunciation of irrebuttable, generalized presumptions as to

67. San Francisco NAA CP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. , 59 F.Supp. 2d at 1025.
Whether or not the settlement allows for racial classifications to be used at all by the district
has been a subject of controversy. While the clause, "race or ethnicity may not be the pri
mary or predominant consideration," would seem to leave open some room for the use of
race, the very next line of the settlement appears to indicate that race may not be used at all:
"Further, the SFUSD will not assign or admit any student to a particular school, class or
program on the basis of the race or ethnicity of that student . . . ." Id.
As a result of this ambiguity, the plaintiffs have insisted that the settlement ruled out any
use of racial classifications in student assignment, whereas the school district has taken the
position that the settlement leaves open the possibility of using race, so long as it is not the
"primary or predominant consideration." See Guthrie, supra note 64 ("The parties to the
suit have different interpretations of whether the settlement . . . lets the district consider race
as one factor in determining enrollment . . . . ); Julian Guthrie, Judge Critical of S.F. Enroll
Plan, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 4, 1999, at A21 (describing parties' different interpretations of
settlement). The presiding judge in the settlement appears to have agreed with the plaintiffs,
ruling that a proposal by the district to use race as one of four factors in admission violated
the terms of the settlement. See Venise Wagner, Judge Fails Plan for Enrollment, S.F.
EXAMINER, Dec. 18, 1999, at Al. Although the SFUSD still maintains that race may be used
under the settlement, it has so far abandoned its plans to use race as one factor among many,
see infra notes 74 and 85 (discussing these proposals), in favor of race-neutral alternatives.
See Katherine Seligman, S. F. Scraps Racial Enroll Plan, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 7, 2000, at Al.
"

68. Wessmann, 1 60 F.3d at 800.
69. Id. at 798.
70. Id.
71. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 448 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.).
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whether a particular student enhances diversity;72 it treated each rec
ognized racial or ethnic group as "monolithic."73

72. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
73. See Wessmann, 1 60 F.3d at 798. Those advocating a more extensive use of racial
classifications in selective school admissions have also argued that racial classifications are
necessary to enhance diversity in order to achieve a certain "critical mass" of minority stu
dents, thereby avoiding racial isolation among those students from underrepresented groups.
In Wessmann, the school board argued that, " [U]nless there is a certain representation of
any given racial or ethnic group in a particular institution, members of that racial or ethnic
group will find it difficult, if not impossible, to express themselves. Thus . . . some minimum
number of black and Hispanic students . . . is required to prevent racial isolation." Id. at 799;
see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 832-33 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (discussing the
University of Michigan Law School's argument that a "critical mass" of minority students is
needed "so that the minority students can contribute to classroom dialog and not feel iso
lated").
Powell's Bakke opinion never discussed the validity of this "critical mass" justification,
but the Harvard Plan he cited approvingly did:
10 or 20 black students could not begin to bring to their classmates and to each other the va
riety of points of view, backgrounds and experiences of blacks in the United States. Their
small numbers might also create a sense of isolation among the black students themselves
and thus make it more difficult for them to develop and achieve their potential. Conse
quently, when making its decisions, the Committee on Admissions is aware that there is
some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse
student body, and between numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those stu
dents admitted.
438 U.S. app. at 323 (opinion of Powell, J.) Intere�tingly, Powell omitted this "critical mass"
language from his long quotation of the Harvard Plan in his opinion. See Id. at 316-17
(opinion of Powell, J.). This omission may have been a conscious recognition by Powell of
what the Wessmann court recognized as an inherent tension between the "critical mass"
theory and the very view of constitutionally permissible diversity espoused by Powell. See
Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 799 ("Insofar as the Policy promotes groups over individuals, it is
starkly at variance with Justice Powell's understanding of the proper manner in which a di
verse student body may be gathered. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318."). Wessmann also recog
nized the contradictory nature of the "critical mass" theory as described by the Harvard Plan
itself: "Furthermore, if justified in terms of group identity, the Policy suggests that race or
ethnic background determines how individuals think or behave - although the School
Committee resists this conclusion by arguing that the greater the number of a particular
group, the more others will realize that the group is not monolithic." Id.
Despite this obvious tension between the "critical mass" theory and Bakke's call for in
dividualized determination of diversity, the Wessmann court was hesitant to reject the justi
fication outright. Rather, it "assume[d] for argument's sake - albeit with considerable skep
ticism - that there may be circumstances under which a form of racial balancing could be
justified," but that "a particularly strong showing of necessity would be required," which
would rely on "solid and compelling evidence" rather than "broad generalizations by a few
witnesses." Id. at 799-800. This requirement of a "particularly strong showing," consistent
with the Court's demands of detailed legislative findings in Croson, is likely to be difficult, if
not impossible, for a school district to meet, as any such showing would have to demonstrate
that the racial classifications employed by the school are "limited and carefully defined" to
achieve the school board's asserted interests in a "sufficiently specific and verifiable" fash
ion. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 613 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) ("[W]hen a legislative body chooses
to employ a suspect classification, it cannot rest upon a generalized assertion as to the classi
fication's relevance to its goals."). As one court has noted, the "critical mass" theory has
"proved to be an amorphous concept. . . . Narrow tailoring is difficult, if not impossible, to
achieve when the contours of the interest being served are so ill-defined." Grutter v.
Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 850-51 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
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A selective school might, however, seek to implement a policy
that, in an attempt to comply with the letter, if not the spirit, of Bakke,
uses race as one factor among many in determining admissions. For
instance, in the wake of Ho, the San Francisco Board of Education
considered using racial classifications as one factor among four or
more other demographic factors, including socioeconomic status and
native language, in an attempt to increase black and ,Latino enrollment
at Lowell High.74 Although the use of race as one factor among many
might appear to abide by Bakke, the way in which race was used as
one factor among many in the San Francisco proposals was not consis
tent with Bakke. Under each proposal, there was no individualized de
termination of whether a student's racial background contributed . to
the student body's diversity.75 Rather, the policy simply ciassified each
student as a member of a particular group and then assessed how th�
student's membership in that group contributed to the group's overall
representation in the student body.76
By assuming, without any individualized consideration of the many
factors discussed in Bakke,77 that membership in a particular racial
group automatically contributed to diversity, the proposed plans vio
lated Bakke's prohibition of irrebuttable, generalized presumptions as
to whether a particular student enhances diversity.78 The proposed
plans, like the Boston Latin plan struck down in Wessmann, impermis
sibly treated each recognized racial or ethnic group as "monolithic."79
No matter how diluted the relevance of racial classifications in these
proposed plans - whether race accounted for twenty-five percent of
an admissions determination or even less - each impermissibly used a
racial classification as an automatic indicator of diversity, instead of
recognizing, as Justice Powell noted, that "the critical criteria are often
individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race but some74. See Guthrie, supra note 64 (describing the district's proposal of using race as one of
four factors, the other three being socioeconomic status, academic achievement, and lan
guage); Ryan Kim, Foe Blasts Schools' New Admission Plan, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 25, 1999,
at Al (describing a later proposal relying "on a variety of criteria including socioeconomic
status, extracurricular activities and whether [students] come from an underrepresented mi
nority group").
75. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319 n.53 (opinion of Powell, J.) (stating that a university must
take account of race on an "individualized, case-by-case basis" in order to avoid "judicial
interference").
76. See Guthrie, supra note 64 ("Students would receive a rating in one of 9 categories:
black, white, Latino, Chinese American, American Indian, Filipino American, Japanese
American, Korean American, and other nonwhite.").
77. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (opinion of Powell, J.) (discussing such qualities as "ex
ceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity,
demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate
with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important").
78. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
79. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 798.
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times associated with it."80 In doing so, the plans impermissibly pre
sumed that membership in a particular racial group automatically con
tributes to the diversity of an educational institution.81
By declining to adopt the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Hopwood
that Powell's Bakke opinion is no longer binding precedent, neither
Wessmann nor Ho precluded the possibility of a selective school using
racial classifications.82 Assuming that Justice Powell's Bakke opinion is
still good law, therefore, a selective school admissions policy that con
siders race in a manner similar to the Harvard Plan ought to pass con
stitutional muster. But the chances of a selective· public school adopt
ing an admission policy akin to the Harvard Plan are slim. At selective
public schools, admissions decisions are generally based on test scores
and grades.83 The kind of individualized assessment of an applicant's
contribution to student body diversity required by Bakke, on the other
80. Bakke, 438 U.S. app. at 324 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Harvard Plan); see also
Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 189 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (striking
down a nonselective magnet school admission program that considered race as one factor
along with income and language).
81. In Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, 2001 U.S. App. LEXI S
19154, at *49-50 (11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001), the court of appeals found that the University of
Georgia's policy of automatically awarding bonus points to nonwhite applicants solely on the
basis of their membership in a racial or ethnic group violated Bakke's requirement of an in
dividualized approach. "If the goal in creating a diverse student body is to develop a univer
sity community where students are exposed to persons of different cultures, outlooks, and
experiences," the court observed, "a white applicant in some circumstances may make a
greater contribution than a non-white applicant." Id. "[A] white applicant from a disadvan
taged rural area in Appalachia" may well offer more in terms of diversity, the court noted,
"than a non-white applicant from an affluent family and a suburban Atlanta high school." Id.
Furthermore, a white applicant "raised in Athens, Greece may have a richer background
and exposure to a much more unusual environment than a non-white applicant who has
spent all his life in Athens, Georgia." Id. But see Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 827
(E.D. Mich. 2000) (upholding the University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions policy
.under which "[u]nder-represented minority applicants automatically receive 20 points [on a
1507point scale] based upon their membership in one of the identified under-represented
minority categories"). In approving the automatic twenty points added to a minority's can
didacy, the Gratz court misapplied Justice Powell's Bakke opinion. By automatically grant
ing certain designated minorities twenty points regardless of their individualized contribu
tion to the diversity of the school, the Michigan plan hardly embodies the flexibility
envisioned by Powell's approved approach. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (opinion of Powell,
J.).
82. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 796. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit in Ho did not even address
the continued vitality of Bakke as it addressed only the question of whether the SFUSD's
use of racial classifications was necessary to remove the vestiges of discrimination the con
sent decree set out to eliminate. See Ho, 147 F.3d at 865. Although the Ninth Circuit never
addressed the compelling nature of diversity as a justification for a school district's use of
racial classifications in Ho, the district court that approved the settlement appears to assume
that Bakke is still good law. See San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist.,
59 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (noting that the settlement does not preclude the
school district from attempting "to ensure that each school has a diverse student body" but
only prohibits the district "from using race or ethnicity as the primary or predominant con
sideration in determining student admissions").
83. See, e.g., Guthrie, supra note 50 (noting that San Francisco's Lowell High School
"traditionally admits students based on their grades alone").
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hand, usually entails an extensive review of a candidate's less quantifi
able qualifications, elicited through personal statements and letters of
recommendation, in a process similar to that employed by many col
leges.84 Using this sort of admissions process, however, is likely to be
cost-prohibitive and administratively infeasible for a public school, re
quiring a very large investment of time and resources into reviewing
applicants' files.85 Although such an admissions process is certainly
possible,86 the actions of the Boston and San Francisco school boards
in the wake of Wessmann and Ho
neither of which seriously con
sidered an individualized approach to admissions - likely illustrate a
hesitance among school districts to adopt admissions programs akin to
the Harvard Plan.87 Consequently, the debate over Justice Powell's
Bakke opinion's continued vitality88 is largely moot in the selective
school context because it is unlikely that school districts will be able to
-

84. See supra note 77.
85. See Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REV. 603,
627 (1999) ("Rich schools and small schools can follow the genteel model that Justice Power
[sic] approves, giving full consideration to every applicant and making nuanced judg
ments. . . . But a school that is big or poor is under much more pressure to use numbers as a
short hand for merit."); cf. Jacques Steinberg, Redefining Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
2001, at A14 (noting that because many public universities "process most applications by
compressing students' SAT scores and grade point averages into numerical formulas that
often account for race," requiring the type of indiviualized consideration of each applicant
mandated by Bakke would be "debilitating" to their admissions processes).
The Boston school district attempted "to vindicate its focus on groups by enumerating
the administrative burdens that would accompany an individualized admissions process," an
argument the Wessmann court rejected. 160 F.3d at 799 n.5. Indeed, the fact that neither
Boston Latin nor Lowell High has adopted or, from available evidence, even considered a
Bakke-style individualized approach to admissions since the Wessmann and Ho decisions is
evidence of the nearly insurmountable practical difficulties such an approach poses for a
public school. See Beth Daley, Exam School Data Show Mixed Results for Admissions Pol
icy, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 23, 2000, at B3 [hereinafter Daley, Exam School Data] (explain
ing that since Wessmann, Boston Latin has used only "race-blind admissions"); Beth Daley,
New Admission Options Sought for Entry to Exam Schools, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 29, 1999,
at B4 (hereinafter Daley, New Admission Options] ("The Boston School Committee will be
asked tonight to consider holding a partial lottery or giving Boston Public School pupils
preference over private school pupils in gaining admission to the city's prestigious exam
schools.").
Similarly, neither of the two plans considered by the San Francisco School Board after
its Ho settlement, see supra note 74 and accompanying text, nor under any others considered
by the district, contemplated screening applicants in the individualized method of the
Harvard Plan by reviewing personal statements, recommendations, or both.
86. Louisville's Central High, a magnet high school whose admissions policies were at
issue in Hampton v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 102 F. Supp. 2d 358 (W.D. Ky.
2000), for instance, appears to have at least reserved the possibility of employing a Harvard
Plan approach to admissions. In particular, the application materials noted that applicants
"may be asked to provide an essay, survey, recommendations, or work samples," in addition
to "grades, standardized test scores, and attendance or behavior data." See id. at 377 n.40. To
what degree the school actually exercised its right to request these materials of applicants is
not clear from the Hampton opinion. See id.
87. See supra note 85.
88. See supra note 32.
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use racial classifications in a way that comports with Bakke's require
ment of an individualized, nuanced approach to admissions. Selective
schools are, therefore, practically, if not theoretically, prohibited from
using racial classifications in their admissions policies.
B.

The "Prevention of De Facto Segregation" Rationale

In addition to the pursuit of the kind of educational diversity rec
ognized by Justice Powell's Bakke opinion, school districts have also
asserted an interest in merely preventing the de facto segregation, or
"racial imbalance,'' that might result if selective school admissions did
not use racial preferences in their admissions process.89 In doing so,
these districts have relied heavily on Chief Justice Burger's Swann dic
tum discussing the power of local officials to pursue integration.90 Be
cause the government's interest in preventing de facto segregation is a
distinct interest from "diversity,'' the argument goes, a different form
of strict scrutiny analysis is required.91 Under this framework, Bakke's
concern for treating each applicant in an individualized way is inappo
site, and racial classifications are permissible because, as one court
stated, "there is no more effective means" to prevent de facto segrega
tion "than to base decisions on race. "92
The assertion of the prevention of de facto segregation as a gov
ernment interest sufficiently compelling to justify the use of racial
classifications rests on a shaky foundation for two reasons. First, the
distinction between the government's interest in pursuing diversity
and the government's interest in preventing de facto segregation is
conceptually very thin, and indeed one court has concluded that there
is no difference at all.93 After all, if de facto segregation is to be pre
vented "in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society,'' as

89. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 801 (noting that in addition to relying on the diversity
argument, the Boston School Committee had asserted that "racial imbalance, without more,
mandates action"); see also Brewer v. Irondequoit, 212 F.3d 738, 752-53 (2d Cir. 2000);
Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 100 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 n.12 (D. Mass. 2000).
90. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
91. See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 752 (overruling lower court for having conducted its inquiry
under the framework of "true diversity" when "the appropriate inquiry . . . is whether the
Program is narrowly tailored to achieve its primary goal of reducing racial isolation resulting
from de facto segregation").
92. Id.
93. See Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch. , 197 F.3d 123, 130
(4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2000) (concluding that, "despite the different
nomenclature, these interests [diversity and the prevention of de facto desegregation] are
one and the same") (citing Brewer v. Irondequoit, 32 F. Supp. 2d 619, 627 (W.D.N.Y. 1999)
(describing the avoidance of racial isolation as "a negatively-phrased expression for attaining
the opposite of racial isolation which is racial diversity"), rev'd, 212 F.3d 738 (2000)).
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Chief Justice Burger declared in his Swann dictum,94 this interest is
quite similar to the interest in exposure to different people and view
points recognized as compelling in Justice Powell's Bakke opinion.95
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, selective public schools, because of
their competitive admissions processes, resemble colleges and univer
sities more than they resemble nonselective schools.96 The Supreme
Court has never recognized a distinction between the government in
terests in diversity and the prevention of de facto segregation in the
context of higher education. Any attempt to distinguish these two in
terests is weakest, therefore, in the context of public schools, such as
selective schools, that most resemble institutions of higher learning.
Second, reliance on the Swann dictum ignores how subsequent
Supreme Court opinions have eroded the force of this language as a
justification for governmental use of racial classifications. As discussed
in the Introduction, the Supreme Court in Bakke, Croson, and
Adarand expressed a deep skepticism about any governmental use of
racial classifications.97 Furthermore, the Court has recently expressed
much less enthusiasm for the pursuit of racial balancing for balancing's
sake, as opposed to the pursuit of racial balancing solely for the pur
pose of dismantling de jure segregation. In Freeman v. Pitts,98 in which
the Court was asked to decide whether a formerly segregated school
district had achieved unitary status, the Court emphasized: "Racial
balance is not to be achieved for its own sake. It is to be pursued when
racial imbalance has been caused by a constitutional violation."99 Al
though Freeman concerned the continuing propriety of a lower court's
desegregation order, the Court's statements have been read to cast
doubt on the constitutionality of the use of racial classifications to
achieve voluntary school integration.100
While the Freeman Court did not condemn racial balancing as an
impermissible objective,101 it considered integration to be a rationale
94. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. , 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); see also
Comfort, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 65 n.12 (distinguishing the Bakke meaning of diversity from the
state's interest in ensuring that its "children simply get used to being in classrooms with peo
ple different from themselves").
95. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-14 (opinion of Powell, J.).
96. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
98. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
99. Id. at 494.
100. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd.,195 F.3d 698, 705 & n.10 (4th Cir.
1999) (per curiam) ("[N]onremedial racial balancing is unconstitutional."(citing Freeman));
Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 132 (noting, after discussing Freeman, that "[a] potential racial imbal
ance does not, however, justify the transfer policy's use of race as a factor to determine eligi
bility for transfers").
101. See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 752 (arguing that Freeman "sheds little light on the consti
tutionality of a voluntary attempt" to integrate).

August 2001]

Integration Without Classification

2021

insufficiently compelling to justify offending other . constitutional
norms - particularly; the traditionallocal control of school systems102
and the imperative to release school districts from federal court super
vision at "the earliest practicable date."103 Integration, therefore, is a
permissible objective of a school district when no independent consti
tutional norms are offended,104 but relying on racial classifications to
achieve integration offends what Professor Rubenfeld has described as
the constitutional norm of "classificationism. "105 Freeman, therefore,
does not necessarily contradict the Swann dictum's tacit approval of
voluntary integration policies.106 Rather, it simply means that school
districts are free to pursue integration provided they do not run rough
shod over other, independent constitutional values - such as the sus
picion of racial classifications.107
102. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) ("No single tradition in public
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools . . . . ").
103. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490.
104. See infra Part III (discussing race-neutral methods to integrate public schools).
105. See cases cited supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
106. It is most likely, after all, that Chief Justice Burger was contemplating race-neutral
student assignment plans - particularly busing - as the type of integration policies that lo
cal officials were empowered to pursue, as the primary issue in Swann was the constitution
ality of a race-neutral busing lower court order. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 27-28.
107. The Hampton court objected to reading Freeman as prohibiting the voluntary use
of racial classifications because school districts under court 'supervision for remedying de
jure discrimination may actually be compelled to rely on racial classifications by federal
court decree; see cases cited supra note 14. Consequently, the Hampton court noted, "[i)t is
incongruous that a federal court could at one moment require a school board to use race to
prevent resegregation of the system, and at the very next moment prohibit that same policy."
Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 379 {W.D. Ky. 2000); see
also Memorandum on Recent Cases Imposing Constitutional Limits on Racial Classifica
tions in K-12 Education, from Professor Roderick M. Hills to his Education Law Class,
University of Michigan Law School at 2 (Winter 2000) (on file with author) ("[T]he re
quirement that racial classifications be subjected to strict scrutiny runs into an interesting
complication: where the state (or its subdivision) has engaged in de jure segregation, the
Court has held that the 14th Amendment can sometimes require the state to use racial classi
fications to eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination. (See, for instance, Swann.) Thus,
the 14th Amendment sometimes requires school districts to use racial classifications and
sometimes the 14th Amendment prohibits school districts from using racial classifications.");
id. at 2-3 ("[S)ometimes the judicial finding that a school district is 'unitary' actually results
in the loss of local control, as the school district loses the power to use racial classifications in
student assignments.").
The Hampton court's objection of "incongruous"-ness is unconvincing because it proves
both too much and too little. It proves too much because even the Hampton court was will
ing to invalidate the school district's use of racial classifications in the magnet school context,
see infra note 127, an area in which the school district had been compelled to use racial clas
sifications before the dissolution of the consent decree. The Hampton court, therefore, had
no problem with at one moment requiring the school district to use race and at the next
moment preventing it from doing so within the magnet school context. The objection proves
too little because there are numerous cases outside the educational context, such as Paradise
v. United States, 480 U.S. 149 (1987), where a state actor is permitted to use race in a manner
in which it would not be at liberty to do so in the absence of a court order requiring such ac
tion. See infra text accompanying note 194 (describing the court order approved in
Paradise).
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A school district might assert that racial balancing for racial bal
ancing's sake is a compelling government interest because the failure
to achieve such a balance may result in the school being sued for un
constitutionally segregating its pupils. In other words, if a school dis
trict takes action, such as creating an elite public high school, that has
the unintended effect of causing a racial imbalance in the city's
schools, the district might be found liable for having facilitated segre
gation of its schools.108 Under Freeman, however, de facto segregation,
as opposed to racial imbalance resulting from conscious government
action with an intent to discriminate, is not unconstitutional.109 The
mere fact that a school district's policy has the incidental effect of in
creasing racial imbalance does not put the school at risk of violating
the Constitution.11° Consequently, a school district cannot plausibly
claim that it needs to rely on voluntary racial classifications to prevent
racial imbalance in order to avoid violating the Fourteenth Amend
ment itself.111
In sum, because selective public schools offer unique educational
benefits to students chosen on the basis of merit, they must abide by
Bakke's requirement of using race in an individualized fashion in
making admissions decisions. As such, admissions schemes like those
108. See, e.g. , Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 19 F. Supp. 2d 449, 454 (D.
Md. 1998) (noting that a school district that adopts a magnet school program has a compel
ling interest in ensuring that its student assignment plan does not "facilitat[e] . . . private
conduct that leads to a discriminatory environment"), rev'd 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2000); id. ("The District obviously has a compelling interest in not
facilitating a discriminatory environment though [sic] state action.").
109. See Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d at 132 (4th Cir. 1999)
(discussing Freeman) .
110. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976) ("(W]e have not held that a
law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pur
sue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.").
In Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), the Supreme Court found a
school district liable for violating the Fourteenth Amendment by facilitating discrimination
through its race-neutral student assignment plan without specifically finding that tile plan
was adopted with a discriminatory purpose. In Green, the Court invalidated the New Kent
County, Virginia, school board's "freedom-of-choice" plan, which allowed parents to choose
the school to which to send their children. After three years of this plan the extreme racial
imbalance in the district persisted. (Indeed, not one white child had chosen to attend the
black school that 85% of the black children continued to attend.) Green is distinguishable,
however, because it involved a school district that had been found to have engaged in blatant
de jure discrimination for years and had done nothing to remedy it. The Court rejected the
"freedom-of-choice" plan because the school board had shirked its "affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary to convert [the district] to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." Id. at 437-38. In a unitary school dis
trict, however, schools are under no "affirmative duty" to dismantle a segregated system.
Therefore, any racial imbalance resulting from a student assignment plan adopted for legiti
mate pedagogical reasons is constitutionally permissible as there exists no duty to disestab
lish state-imposed segregation as there was in Green.
·

111. See Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 129-30 (concluding that when a school district is under
no court-imposed duty to desegregate, racial classifications need not be "tolerated").
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reviewed in Wessmann or Ho that rely on separate applicant pools or
automatically grant preferences to students of particular racial or eth
nic groups without any individualized determination of the student's
contribution to the school's diversity are unconstitutional. Because
selective public schools are unlikely to adopt admissions programs that
engage in the kind of individualized candidate evaluation envisioned
by Bakke, selective schools seeking to enhance diversity will need to
rely on means other than racial classifications to accomplish this goal.
Furthermore, the prevention of de facto segregation does not amount
to a state interest sufficiently compelling to justify the use of racial
classifications in selective school admissions, particularly because se
lective schools so resemble institutions of higher learning, a context in
which the Supreme Court has never endorsed the prevention of de
facto segregation as a compelling interest.
In addition, regardless of whether diversity or the prevention of de
facto segregation is offered as a justification for the use of racial classi
fications in selective school student assignment, the availability of
race-neutral alternatives to achieve either end, as Section III.B will
demonstrate, further counsels against the constitutionality of any race
classifying scheme. In United States v. Paradise,112 and later in
Croson,113 the Supreme Court declared that in analyzing the constitu
tionality of a government measure relying on racial classifications, the
Court would look to the availability and efficacy of "race-neutral
means" - i.e., programs that do not rely on racial classifications - to
effectuate the same "race-conscious" ends.114 Because such race
neutral alternatives are available to school officials, as Section III.A
will explain, those that rely on the dangerous tool of racial classifica
tions are much more suspect.
112. 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (discussing the impor
tance of evaluating "the efficacy of alternative remedies" in approving a race-classifying ju
dicial decree).
113. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (inquiring into the
availability of "race-neutral means" in examining the constitutionality of state and municipal
legislation that relies on racial classifications); see also Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Ga., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19154, at *52-53 (11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001) (requiring a
university defending an admissions policy relying on racial classifications to "show that it has
genuinely considered, and rejected as inadequate, race-neutral alternatives for creating stu
dent body diversity"); Hayes v. N. State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 216
(4th Cir. 1993) (inquiring into the availability of race-neutral alternatives).
114. The Paradise Court used the term "race-conscious" to describe a district court or
der requiring the Alabama state police to promote certain quotas of blacks to particular po
sitions in an effort to remedy past discrimination in the department. 480 U.S. at 171 (plural
ity opinion). The Court's use of the term "race-conscious," at least in this case, however, is
different from this Note's definition. This Note uses "race-conscious" to refer to state pro
grams that take note of race but do not rely on racial classifications. A "race-conscious" pro
gram may also be "race-classifying," as was the decree being reviewed in Paradise, but it
need not be. Rather, it may be "race-conscious," - adopted at least in part in order to bene
fit a certain race or races - yet "race-neutral," in that it avoids using racial classifications to
accomplish its goals.
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RACIAL CLA S SIFICATION S IN NON SELECTIVE SCHOOL S

Unlike selective public schools, nonselective schools do not con
sider an individual student's merit - test ·Scores, grades, etc. - in
making their admissions decisions.115 In the absence of a merit-based
determination, therefore, some have argued that the government is
free, or at least freer, to use racial classifications in determining pupil
assignment.u6 This Part rejects that assertion and argues that racial
classifications may play only a limited role in the assignment of stu
dents to nonselective public schools. Section II.A explains why the use
of racial classifications in schools that purport to offer unique educa
tional benefits, often called "magnet schools," is almost always uncon
stitutional. Although magnet schools do not consider merit in evalu
ating candidates, they nevertheless resemble the selective schools
discussed in Part I by "offer[ing] a specialized curriculum or innova
tive instructional style not found in other schools" in the district.117
Consequently, school officials' ability to use race in designing admis
sions policies is similarly constrained. Section II.B then explains how
school officials have some limited latitude to use racial classifications
in controlling transfers between ostensibly equal, or "fungible,"
schools within or without a district. Unlike selective or magnet
schools, fungible schools do not purport to offer any specific peda
gogical benefits. Nevertheless, school district officials do not enjoy
carte blanche to employ racial classifications in assigning students
among fungible schools. Rather, school officials may use racial classifi
cations only when the need to do so is urgent, as in the case of massive
residential white flight, but otherwise must choose race-neutral alter
natives to promote integration.
A.

Magnet Schools

In an effort to improve educational quality and increase parental
and student choice, school districts have increasingly established mag-

115. See, e.g., Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d
123, 125 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that admission to the magnet school at issue was "not
based on merit"), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2000).
116. See Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 19 F. Supp. 2d 449, 454 (D. Md.
1998) (noting that unlike Bakke, which concerned admission to a medical school, first grade
students will not have "extensive resumes which may be weighed and considered" in the
admissions process), rev'd, 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2000);
Harvard Note, supra note 38, at 955-56 ("Perhaps most importantly, students being denied
admission to elementary and secondary schools often have a lesser claim to be entitled to
admission based on 'merit.' ").
117. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 233 F.3d 232, 302 (4th Cir. 2000)
(Traxler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), vacated and reh'g en bane granted (4th
Cir. Jan. 17, 2001).
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net schools that offer unique pedagogical approaches.118 Some school
districts have also adopted magnet schools in an effort to promote in
tegration by enticing students away from their more segregated neigh
borhood or private schools. 1 19 Enrollment in magnet schools is gener
ally voluntary in that the district initially assigns students to an
ordinary, nonmagnet school, but parents may attempt to opt out of
this default assignment by applying for admission to a magnet
school.120 The geographic base of the magnet school is, therefore, usu
ally district-wide, whereas the geographic base of the ordinary, non
magnet school is usually confined to a neighborhood or a collection of
neighborhoods within the district.121
Because magnet schools offer unique educational benefits, . the
number of applicants often exceeds the number of slots available.122
As a result, magnet schools utilize lotteries to select among the exces
sive number of applicants.123 In an effort to ensure a racially diverse
student body, some school districts have adopted weighted lotteries
that seek to ensure that the racial composition of the student body
remains at or near a certain level - often a level equal to the racial
composition of the school district as a whole.124 Instead of weighted
lotteries, some school districts have adopted entirely separate lotteries
for different racial groups in order to ensure a certain racial composi
tion, 125 a policy reminiscent of the Cal-Davis medical school's separate
·

1 18. Id. (describing magnet schools as those offering a "specialized curriculum or inno
vative instructional style not found in other schools in the system").
119. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 76 n.1 (1995); id. at 92 ("Magnet schools have the
advantage of encouraging voluntary movement of students within a school district in a pat
tern that aids desegregation on a voluntary basis . . . ."); see also Belk, 233 F.3d at 267 (noting
that " [s]ince the 1970s, school boards throughout the country have utilized magnet schools as
part of desegregation plans").
120. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. 76 n.1 (describing magnet schools as "public schools of volun
tary enrollment"); see, e.g. , Belk, 233 F.3d at 268-69 (explaining how the Charlotte
Mecklenburg magnet school system works).
121. See, e.g. , Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. , 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 377
(W.D. Ky. 2000) (noting that Louisville's Central High Magnet Career Academy is "one of
very few" schools in the district "with no geographic attendance base; all of its students ap
ply for and participate in one of four special magnet programs").
122. See, e.g. , Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701 (4th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam) (describing situation in which an Arlington, Va., magnet school had "185 applicants
for only 69 available positions"), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1050 (2000).
123. See, e.g., Belk, 233 F.3d at 269 (describing the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools' use
of lotteries to assign students to magnet schools).
124. In Tuttle, for instance, a magnet school used a weighted lottery for admission that
weighted the "probabilities associated with each applicant's lottery number . . . so that appli
cants from under-represented [racial or ethnic] groups . . . had an increased [chance of being]
select[ed]." 195 F.3d at 702.
125. See, e.g., Belk, 233 F.3d at 269 ("CMS (Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools] generally
assigns students to its magnet schools using two parallel lotteries, one for black students and
one for students of other races."); Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 378 (noting that
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admissions tracks struck down in Bakke.126 Some of these districts
have used these separate lotteries to exclude students of an over
represented race even when the school is operating under capacity.127
Much like the selective public schools discussed in Part I, magnet
schools, although nonselective, offer unique educational opportunities
unavailable in nonmagnet schools.128 Students denied admission to a
magnet school lose an opportunity to learn in an environment that of
fers an enriched curriculum or a special learning environment.129 Con
sequently, when a school district decides who may attend its magnet
schools on the basis of racial classifications, it, as one court observed,
"denies a benefit, causes a harm, and imposes a burden" on applicants
of the over-represented race.130
To survive strict scrutiny, magnet school admissions programs re
lying on racial classifications must be narrowly tailored measures fur
thering compelling government interests.131 As the Fourth Circuit
noted in striking down Arlington's weighted lottery magnet school
Louisville's Central High magnet school "has two admissions tracks: one exclusively for
blacks, and another for everyone else").
126. See supra note 25 (discussing the admissions policy at issue in Bakke).
127. In Hampton, for instance, Louisville's magnet Central High had a racial composi
tion of fifty percent African-American in 1999, which equaled the target black enrollment
set by the district's racial guidelines. 102 F. Supp. 2d at 377. Although Central's enrollment
was about 300 or 400 students below capacity, black applicants were selected using a random
lottery whereas white applicants were automatically admitted. See id. at 377. Under this sys
tem, at least 133, and possibly as many as 400, black applicants were rejected from Central
despite its operating under capacity. See id. at 377 n.40 (noting conflicting testimony as to the
number of African-American students excluded). The court ultimately rejected this plan as
unconstitutional upon dissolution of the desegregation consent decree. See id. at 379.
Note that although Central appears to have relied primarily on its lottery system to se
lect black applicants, black applicants also were told that they "may be asked to provide an
essay, survey, recommendations, or work samples. Additionally, the school may review
grades, standardized test scores, and attendance or behavior data." Id. at 377 n.40. The court
noted, however, that "[t]here is no evidence that any such materials are ever requested of
white applicants." Id. Central, therefore, was apparently operating as a hybrid selective
nonselective school. It operated nonselectively in its admission of white applicants, and it
operated quasi-selectively in its admission of black applicants.
128. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
129. See Belk, 233 F.3d at 302 (Traxler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 381. Because magnet schools often have more appli
cants than available slots, any admissions policy that relies on racial classifications consti
tutes what the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has called a "stacked deck" or "pref
erence" program in that "the state specifically favors members of minorities in competition
with members of the majority for benefits that the state can give to some citizens but not to
all." Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 , 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1230
(W.D. Wash. 2001) (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco Unified Sch.
Dist., 616 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1 980) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Such a program,
consequently, imposes a "harm" on members of a particular race, id. at 1231 (quoting Coali
tion for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 707 n.16 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted)), as opposed to a mere "deck shuffle" or "reshuffling," which, according to
the Ninth Circuit, imposes no such harm. See id.
131. See Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
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admission program in Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board, such
schemes fail strict scrutiny analysis because they do not consider "each
applicant as an individual," which is what Bakke requires of institu
tions that employ racial classifications to achieve diversity.132 Much
like the racial set-asides discussed in Part I, these admissions proce
dures give a preference to certain applicants "solely because of their
race."133 By focusing solely on racial or ethnic diversity, as did the ad
missions policy at Louisville's magnet Central High struck down in
Hampton v. Jefferson County Board of Education,134 such programs do
not further attainment of "genuine diversity" but rather hinder it.135
Even when the use of race is one of a few factors used to weight
the admissions lottery, such a policy is still likely to be unconstitu
tional. In Tuttle, the Arlington School District implemented a policy
similar to those considered by the San Francisco Board of Education
after Ho as discussed in Part I.136 In particular, Arlington made race
one of three equally weighted factors in its lottery, the other two being
socioeconomic status and whether English was the applicant's first or
second language.137 Despite diluting the importance of race in the lot
tery, such a scheme does not pass strict scrutiny under Bakke because
there is no individualized determination of whether a student's racial
background contributes to the student body's diversity.138 While objec
tive, nonracial factors like those used in Tuttle may certainly be part of
a school's assessment of an individual applicant's contribution to di
versity, any consideration of race, per Bakke, must take place in the
context of a determination that also takes into account individualized
factors like "extra-curricular interest, life experiences, or the myriad
other educational or cultural axes."139
Because magnet schools do not employ merit-based admissions
processes like those used by selective public schools, some have ar
gued that Bakke is of limited relevance outside of the context of selec
tive schools.140 According to this argument, Bakke assumes that race
132. See 195 F.3d at 707 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317).
133. Id.
134. 102 F. Supp. 2d at 377; see supra note 127 (describing Central High's admissions
policy).
135. See Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 378 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315) (opinion of
Powell, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. See supra notes 85 to 92 and accompanying text.
137. See Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 701.
138. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
139. Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
140. See Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 751 (2d Cir. 2000)
(noting that Bakke "is not directly on point"); Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm.,
100 F. Supp. 2d 57, 67 (D. Mass. 2000); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 19 F.
Supp. 2d 449, 454 (D. Md. 1998), rev'd, 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S.
1019 (2000); Harvard Note, supra note 38, at 955-56.
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may be used as one of many factors in an effort to achieve diversity,
but when these other individuated factors enumerated in Bakke such as "work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity,
[or] demonstrated compassion" - are practically nonexistent, as they
are in the case of six-year-olds applying to a magnet school program,141
the school's interest in pursuing diversity ought to trump Bakke's con
cern for treating each applicant as an individual.142 In other words, if
the premises of Justice Powell's concern for treating each applicant as
an individual in Bakke do not exist because young children have yet to
constitute themselves as individuals, then a school seeking student
body diversity that includes racial diversity has no choice but to con
sider race in a fashion that treats racial groups as monolithic.
The problem with this argument is that it misconceives the mean
ing of the diversity interest endorsed by Justice Powell. Although
Justice Powell recognized the state's compelling interest in achieving a
diverse student body, ethnic diversity was considered "only one ele
ment in a range of factors" that a university may properly consider in
its pursuit of the goal of heterogeneity.143 Consequently, if students
have yet to constitute themselves as individuals in a way that prevents
a school from assembling a class that is a collection of truly diverse in
dividuals, then the school would not be pursuing the kind of diversity
envisioned by Bakke. Rather, the school would be pursuing something
more like racial balancing - the pursuit of particular percentages of
racial and ethnic groups for its own sake - which Bakke expressly
forbade.144
Even if their student assignment plans do not further "diversity" in
the Bakke sense of the word, however, some school districts, as dis
cussed earlier, have defended their race-classifying magnet school in
tegration policies on the basis of their pursuit of the supposedly con
ceptually distinct government interest in preventing de facto
segregation.145 As discussed earlier, at least one court has decided that
there is no conceptual distinction between these two interests.146
141. See Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 454 ("But it must be remembered that Bakke dealt
with admissions to medical school. . . . It is obviously unlikely that first graders will have ex
tensive resumes which may be weighed and considered in addition to their race in the Dis
trict's formulation of how to craft diverse classrooms.").
142. See id. at 455.
143. See Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
144. See id. at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its
student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or
ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially
invalid.").
145. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
146. See Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 130 ("[D)espite the different nomenclature, these inter
ests [diversity and the prevention of de facto desegregation) are one and the same.").
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Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that diversity and the prevention
of de facto segregation are distinct government interests, the question
remains whether the latter amounts to a government interest suffi
ciently compelling to justify the use of racial classifications. As argued
above, although Chief Justice Burger's Swann dictum may appear to
provide support for the proposition · that the prevention of de facto
segregation is a compelling government interest, more recent Supreme
Court opinions have seriously undercut the power of this dictum by
taking a skeptical view of the use of racial classifications and by ques
tioning the utility of achieving racial balancing for its own sake.147
In creating selective school admissions plans that rely on racial
classifications, school administrators are generally concerned with en
suring a minimum amount of minority students so that the one or two
selective schools in the district do not have predominantly white or
Asian populations or both.148 By contrast, in designing their nonselec
tive school student assignment plans, district officials are sometimes
concerned with ensuring that no school in the district becomes too as
sociated with any particular minority group, such as black or Hispanic.
In Hampton, for instance, the school district was concerned that with
out a racial balancing plan, certain schools would become identifiably
black and "racially isolated," thereby sending a message of racial infe
riority.149
The Supreme Court's recent decisions have made clear, however,
that no such message of inferiority should be inferred, and that the
government's interest in ensuring that schools do not become identi
fiably black or Hispanic is not particularly strong. In Freeman, the
Court affirmed a lower court's dissolution of a desegregation decree
even though there was racial imbalance among the district's schools;150
one school in the district, for instance, had become seventy-six percent
black.151 The Freeman Court concluded, however, that imbalance re-

147. See supra notes 97-1 1 1 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 792-94 (1st Cir. 1998) (describing how
Boston Latin's admissions scheme was adopted because of a " [c]oncern[] that the number of
African-American and Hispanic students . . . might drop precipitously without a predeter
mined set-aside"); Julian Guthrie, Race Gap to Widen Further at Lowell Next Year; Fewer
Blacks and Latinos, More Asians and Whites, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 10, 2000, at Al (de
scribing how without the race-classifying admissions scheme defended by the school board in
the Ho litigation, the number of blacks and Latinos accepted to Lowell dropped precipi
tously).
149. See Hampton
(W.D. Ky. 2000).

v.

Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d at 371, 375-76

150. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1992).
151. Id. at 477-78.
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suiting from private residential choices rather than from de jure dis
crimination does not amount to unconstitutional segregation.152
The Court took a similar approach in its 1995 Missouri v. Jenkins
decision, in which it struck down as overbroad the attempt of a federal
district court to fashion an interdistrict remedy to cure intradistrict
segregation.153 In particular, the Court rejected the lower court's con
clusion that because the violating school district (Kansas City, Mo.)
was 68. 3 % black, a purely intradistrict remedy would be inadequate at
sufficiently integrating the schools.154 Rather, the lower court fash
ioned a remedy that required the city and state to pay for new magnet
schools designed to attract nonminority students to the Kansas City
schools.155 Although Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion did
not directly discuss the claim, accepted by the district court, that ra
cially identifiable schools create a stigma of inferiority, Justice Tho
mas's concurrence attacked this claim.156 Justice Thomas noted that
such a claim "not only relies upon questionable social science research
rather than constitutional principle, but it also rests on an assumption
of black inferiority."157 Justice Thomas's views echo those of accom
plished scholars like Professor Derrick A. Bell, Jr., who have argued
that educational equality for blacks can be better achieved through the
improvement of majority-black schools than through racial balance
remedies.158 Indeed, many blacks increasingly share this belief.159
These considerations support the Hampton court's decision that

152. Id. at 496 ("It is simply not always the case that demographic forces causing popu
lation change bear any real and substantial relation to a de jure violation. And the law need
not proceed on that premise.").
153. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
154. Id. at 91.
155. Id.
1 56. See id. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring).
157. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
158. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., A School Desegregation Post-Mortem, 62 TEX. L. REV.
175, 189 (1983) (reviewing DAV ID L. KIRP, JUST SCHOOLS: THE IDEA OF RACIAL
EQUALITY IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (1982)).
159. See Leon Stafford, Ga. Schools Becoming Resegregated; Immigration, Living Pat
terns, Parental Desire for Neighborhood Schools Are Bringing Change, ATL. CONST., June
17, 1999, at la ("Longtime proponents of integration, such as the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, have had a change of heart concerning schools that are
predominantly minority . . . sa(ying) the time has come for schools with predominantly black
student bodies to become centers of academic excellence."); Jeffrey Rosen, The Lost Prom
ise of School Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000, § 4, at 1, 5 (noting that " (f)orced to
choose between racial diversity and educational quality, most African-American parents
seem to agree with Justice Thomas. In a 1 998 survey . . . 82 percent of the black parents said
that raising academic standards was more important than achieving more diversity and inte
gration"); see also sources cited infra note 303 and accompanying text.
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Louisville's Central High ought not to be denying admission to black
applicants for fear of the school becoming too black.160
In sum, although they do not make their admissions determina
tions on the basis of test scores, grades, or other indications of merit,
magnet schools nevertheless offer unique educational benefits and,
consequently, any student assignment plan using race must do so in a
manner that abides by Bakke's requirement of an individualized
evaluation. Consequently, as in the selective school context, because
such an individualized approach to admissions is costly and time
consuming, public schools would likely abandon the use of racial clas
sifications altogether.161 An attempt to justify the use of race as a tool
for preventing de facto segregation, rather than simply as a measure
for achieving Bakke-style diversity, also fails because the Supreme
Court's recent decisions have taken a skeptical view of pursuing racial
balancing for the sake of racial balancing when other constitutional
values - in this case, "classificationism"162 - are offended.163 Fur
thermore, as Section III.B will demonstrate, the availability of race
neutral methods to increase racial diversity counsels against the consti
tutional approval of schemes that rely on racial classifications.164
B.

Fungible Schools

In most school districts, students are assigned to a particular school
based on the neighborhood in which they live and are generally not
allowed to choose another school.165 An increasing number of districts,
however, have adopted open enrollment policies of some sort, which
allow for students to transfer between ostensibly equal schools within
(or, less frequently, outside of) the district.166 Many of these open
enrollment districts have utilized racial classifications in an attempt to
achieve or maintain a desired racial composition for the schools
160. See supra note 127 (explaining how Central High placed a cap on black students).
161. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 101-107 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text (discussing the Paradise and
Croson inquiry into the availability and efficacy of race-neutral methods as a part of the
analysis of the constitutionality of a race-classifying government program).
165. See Richard F. Elmore, Choice in Public Education, in THE POLITICS OF
EXCELLENCE AND CHOICE IN EDUCATION 79, 79-86, 93-95 (William Lowe Boyd & Charles
Taylor Kerchner, eds., 1988) , reprinted in YUDOF ET AL., supra note 13, at 424-29, 429-31
(describing the limited amount of choice among schools within a district normally offered to
parents).
166. See Jodi Wilgoren, Schools Are Now Marketers Where Choice ls Taking Hold, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2001, at Al (describing the rapid growth of public school choice). As of
2000, "twenty states [had] open enrollment laws that allow children to transfer from district
to district." Rosen, supra note 159, at 5.
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throughout the district.167 Under these policies, students are prohibited
from transferring into or out of a particular school if such a transfer
would adversely affect either school's racial balance.168 Some · have ar
gued that using race is more acceptable in these circumstances than in
the selective or magnet school contexts because the student is not be
ing denied the opportunity to attend a school that offers any special
educational benefits.169 This Section argues that school districts gener
ally may not employ racial classifications in apportioning transfers
among ostensibly equal schools, except in cases of rampant white
flight in the community.
A number of lower courts have recognized that the interests of a
student in attending a magnet or selective school are greater than
those of a student in attending a particular nonmagnet school because
the education offered is ostensibly "equivalent" to that offered at
other nonmagnet schools either within or without the district.170 Un
like magnet schools, which offer students a unique, specialized educa
tion, nonmagnet schools are considered to offer a comparable or "fun
gible" education because they do not use a specialized pedagogical
method.171 Consequently, the argument goes, schools ought to be free
to use racial classifications to distribute students among these fungible
schools since no burden is imposed nor benefit conferred.172 While ac
knowledging that parents may have strong "subjective" preferences

167. See, e.g., Equal Open Enrollment Assoc. v. Bd. of Educ., 937 F.Supp. 700, 702
(N.D. Ohio 1996) (striking down Akron's use of racial classifications in prohibiting transfers
by white students out of a school with a high percentage of minorities).
168. See id.
169. See, e.g. , Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. , 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 380
(W.D. Ky. 2000) ("conclud(ing] that as between two regular elementary schools, assignment
to one or another imposes no burden and confers no benefit").
170. See Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 752 (2d Cir. 2000}
(noting that the white plaintiff denied a transfer to an ordinary high school in a different dis
trict was still being offered "an equivalent alternative education"); Belk v. Charlotte
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. , 233 F.3d 232, 306 (4th Cir. 2000} (Traxler, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), vacated and reh'g en bane granted (4th Cir. Jan. 17, 2001}. ("While a
child denied a transfer from one conventional school to another still receives the same gen
eral education, a child denied admission to a specialized magnet program does not receive a
similar benefit in a conventional school."); Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. , 604 F.2d 504, 518 (7th
Cir. 1979) (noting that the black plaintiffs denied transfers were still attending "comparable"
schools), vacated mem., 449 U.S. 915 (1980); Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm. ,
100 F. Supp. 2d 57, 67 (D. Mass. 2000} (noting that the schools to which white students have
been denied transfers under the district's voluntary integration plan are "more fungible"
than Boston Latin in Wessmann); Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 380 (concluding that "as be
tween two regular elementary schools, assignment to one or another imposes no burden and
confers no benefit").
171. See Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 380 (noting that "as between two regular elemen
tary schools . . . [t]he same education is offered at each school, so assignment to one or an
other is basically fungible").
172. See id.
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for their children to attend one fungible school over another,173 some
lower courts have dismissed these preferences as "constitutionally
[in]significant"174 because "there is no clear objective benefit to at
tending any one school over another."175
While these lower courts may be right that the lack of any "objec
tive" benefit offered by attendance at a fungible school means that less
of a harm has been imposed, they are incorrect to conclude that no
harm of any "constitutionally significant" dimension has been suf
fered. Although the Supreme Court placed much emphasis on the
"importance" of the right to education in Brown,176 later commenta
tors have criticized this approach as disingenuous or just off-the-mark
for, as Professor Michael McConnell has noted, "[n]ot everything that
is 'important' is a civil right and . . . not everything that is a civil right is
'important.' "177 Rather, the essential constitutional principle is com
plete equality in all civil rights, irrespective of the importance of the
right asserted.178 Indeed, the Court's reliance on the importance of
education, rather than the simple notion of equality, was belied by its
subsequent per curiam opinions that relied on Brown to order the de
segregation of seemingly un-"important" government services like golf
courses and beaches.179
173. Comfort, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
174. Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 380 n.43.
175. Comfort, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 67 (emphasis added); see also Hampton, 102 F. Supp.
2d at 380 n.43 ("[S]tudents and their parents might prefer one ["fungible"] school over an
other. The preference may even arise from a perception that one school is better than others
due to its location, its teachers and principal, or its classroom environment. However, these
matters of personal preference do not distinguish those schools in a constitutionally signifi
cant sense."); Belk, 233 F.3d at 306 n.10 (Traxler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(recognizing "that parents [may] perceive that one 'fungible' conventional school is superior
to another because of a number of intangibles such as the reputation of teachers or the new
ness of facilities. However, these 'personal preferences' do not rise to a level of constitu
tional significance." (citing Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 380 n.43)) .
176. Brown I , 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954) (describing education a s "perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments" and recognizing "the importance of edu
cation to our democratic society" (emphases added)).
177. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
REV. 947, 1135 (1995) (quoting Brown /, 342 U.S. at 493); see also Edmond Cahn, Jurispru
dence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 167 (1955) (criticizing the Court's reliance on social science
data in establishing the importance of a right to education as allowing "our fundamental
rights [to] rise, fall, or change along with the latest fashions of psychological literature").
178. McConnell, supra note 177, at 1135 (emphasis added) (quoting Brown I, 347 U.S. at
493 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
179. See Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (per curiam) (municipal auditorium
seating); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam) (courtroom seating); Turner v.
City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam) (airport restaurant); State Athletic
Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (per curiam) (athletic contests); New Orleans City
Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (public parks and golf
course); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (segregation of busses); Mayor
of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (public beaches and bath
houses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (municipal golf courses).

2034

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1999

Consequently, school districts that condition the right to transfer to
another school on a student's race do impose a harm of some constitu
tional significance.180 Even if a parent's desire to send her child to a
different school is based on purely subjective preferences, which may
arise, as one court noted, from "a perception that one school is better
than another due to its location, its teachers and principal, or its class
room environment,"181 a constitutional harm is imposed because an
educational choice is being denied to a parent of one race while being
extended to the parent of another.182 Although there is no constitu
tional right to attend the school of one's choice - or even to attend
public school altogether183 - once a school district creates such a
privilege, it must mete it out in a way that treats the races equally.184
The mere fact that the government has no obligation to create the
privilege in the first place does not mean that once it creates the
privilege, it may attach whatever racial conditions it pleases to the ex
ercise of that privilege.185 The denial, therefore, of even a parent's
subjective preference for her child to attend a particular school im
poses a constitutional harm when such a denial is made on the basis of
the suspect classification of race.
180. See Equal Open Enrollment Assoc. v. Bd. of Educ., 937 F. Supp. 700, 708 (N.D.
Ohio 1996) (granting a white plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction challenging de
nial of transfer to a fungible school on racial grounds for the plan denied certain students
"the benefit of the law solely because of the color of their skin").
181. Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 380 n.43 (describing a parent's desire for her child to
attend one fungible school over another as based on "perception" and as solely a matter of
"personal preference").
182. See Equal Open Enrollment Assoc. , 937 F. Supp. at 708.
183. See San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 , 37-38 (1 973) (conclud
ing that education is not a "fundamental right or liberty").
184. See supra text accompanying note 178. Although the Rodriguez Court refused to
recognize the "fundamentality" of the right to an education in declining to strike down
Texas's unequal school funding system, it reaffirmed its commitment to educational equality
"in the context of racial discrimination." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29. The Court also refused
to recognize poverty as a suspect class, noting that "at least where wealth is involved, the
Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages."
Id. at 23-24. Consequently, the Court applied rational basis scrutiny to Texas's funding
scheme. Because race is a suspect classification, however, strict scrutiny must be applied to
any educational system that discriminates on the basis of race, and, therefore, the "absolute
equality or precisely equal advantages" that the Rodriguez Court found was not necessary in
the wealth context is required when racial classifications are employed. Id. at 24. Indeed, the
Brown Court itself had declared that although the State was under no obligation to provide
an education to all of its citizens in the first place, "where the state has undertaken to pro
vide it, . . . [it] must be made available to all on equal terms." Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954).
185. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("[E]ven though a person has no
'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him
the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government
may not rely."); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (holding that although
California was not obligated to create a tax exemption for veterans, once it did so it was
obliged to extend it to all who qualified without attaching unconstitutional conditions).
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Additionally, a parent's desire for her child to attend one school
over another because of location, teachers, principal, or classroom en
vironment can hardly be dismissed as a merely "subjective" or per
sonal preference.186 In particular, a student denied an opportunity to
transfer to a school in a different district, as in Equal Open Enrollment
Association v. Board of Education,181 and Brewer v. West Irondequoit
Central School District,188 may be deprived of a significant educational
opportunity. After all, in most states there are wide disparities among
school districts in terms of funding,189 and funding disparities may, of
course, affect educational quality.190 Furthermore, even within a school
district, there may be significant differences among supposedly "fun
gible" schools in terms of curricular offerings, extracurricular activi
ties, facilities, and other educational amenities.191 While such criteria
of selection may be "subjective" or personal in that the parent has to
decide which aspects of a school are personally important to her, they
are not so idiosyncratic as to be dismissed as constitutionally insignifi
cant.
In Paradise v. United States, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion de
scribed several criteria to be considered when reviewing government
programs that use racial classifications in ameliorating past discrimina
tion in hiring practices:192 "the necessity for the relief and the efficacy
of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of the relief, in
cluding the availability of waiver provisions; the relationship of the
numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the
relief on the rights of third parties."193 In Paradise, the Court affirmed
186. Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 380 n.43.
187. 937 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
188. 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000).
189. See YUDOF ET AL., supra note 13, at 599.
190. See id. at 599-601.
191. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224,
1231 n.7 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (recognizing that students denied the chance to attend the sup
posedly fungible school of their choice under an intra-district open enrollment plan "are de
prived of curriculum advantages not necessarily available at other schools"); id. at 1239
(noting that some of the supposedly fungible schools_"continue to offer less attracti"'.e pro
gramming and facilities"); see also Wilgoren, supra note 166, at Al (describing how in school
districts with open enrollment plans parents and their children choose schools on the basis of
criteria like "start times, uniform policies, educational programs, even cafeteria menus").
192. 480 U.S. 149 (1987). Although the opinion stated that these criteria would be ap
plied in reviewing any "race-conscious" government program, it is clear from the opinion
itself, which named "the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies" as one of the rele
vant evaluative criteria, id. at 171 (plurality opinion), and subsequent Court decisions like
Croson, which also looked to the efficacy of "race-neutral means," City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (quoting Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171), that this analysis is to be
limited to race-conscious race-classifying measures rather than those that are race-conscious
yet race-neutral. See also supra note 114.
ria:

193. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171. In his concurrence, Justice Powell listed five similar crite-
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a lower court order requiring the Alabama Department of Public
Safety to promote one qualified black candidate for every white can
didate promoted in order to remedy decades of discrimination by the
department.194 In approving the lower court order, Justice Brennan
stressed that "[t]he one-for-one requirement did not impose an unac
ceptable burden on innocent third parties" - the. qualified white em
ployees who would be passed over in favor of black candidates - for
the order merely denied or delayed a promotion, but did not result in
any white employee losing his job altogether.195
In particular, Justice Brennan noted that the order did not "dis
proportionately harm the interests of . . . innocent individuals."1% The
Court's concern for proportionality in Paradise and elsewhere197 has
been characterized by Professor Jed Rubenfeld as a "cost-benefit justi
ficatory test" for racial classifications.198 Under this test, strict scrutiny
"determine[s] whether a law that causes acknowledged constitutional
harms is justified by sufficiently important benefits that a less constitu
tionally costly ('better tailored' or 'less restrictive') law could not have
achieved. "199

(i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the planned duration of the remedy; (iii) the rela
tionship between the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage of
minority group members in the relevant population or work force; (iv) the availability of
waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met; and (v) the effect of the remedy upon ·
innocent third parties.
Id. at 187 (Powell, J., concurring). In Croson, the Supreme Court extended the applica
tion of the Paradise criteria outside the hiring context to other race-classifying government
programs, see Croson, 488 U.S. at 507, and at least one lower court has followed suit by ap
plying the Paradise criteria to student assignment plans that rely on racial classifications.
Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 706 (1999) (per curiam), cert. dismissed,
529 U.S. 1050 (2000); see also Brewer, 212 F.3d at 756-57 (Miner, J., dissenting) (using the
Paradise factors to analyze a race-classifying open enrollment plan); Wessmann v. Gittens,
160 F.3d 790, 828-31 (1st Cir. 1998) (Lipez, J., dissenting) (same).
Additionally, another federal appellate court has considered the Paradise factors rele
vant in assessing the constitutionality of racial preferences in university admissions. See
Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19154, at *45-49 (11th
Cir. Aug. 27, 2001) (viewing "the Paradise factors as providing general guidance, but tailor
ing those factors slightly to fit these types of cases").
194. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 163-64.
195. Id. at 182-83 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.); see also id. at 188 (Powell, J., con
curring) (noting that "the effect of the order on innocent white troopers is likely to be rela
tively diffuse").
196. Id. at 183 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
197. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 230 (1995) ("[T]he ap
plication of strict scrutiny . . . determines whether a compelling governmental interest justi
fies the infliction of that injury.").
198. Rubenfeld, supra note 31, at 438.
199. Id. ; see also Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral
Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L. J. 2331, 2361 (2000) ("Strict scrutiny serves to ensure that the
potentially harmful effects of racial classifications are outweighed by the interests they
serve.").
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Applying Paradise's "cost-benefit justificatory test" to the use of
racial classifications in assigning students among fungible schools, such
plans do not ordinarily pass constitutional muster. By denying educa
tional opportunities to students on the basis of color these programs
inflict a harm of constitutional dimension on "innocent third par
ties."200 The harm cannot be justified because effective race-neutral
means are ordinarily available to school officials to achieve integra
tion, as Section 111.C will explain. The "duration" Paradise factor also
counsels against open-ended race-classifying schemes with no end date
in sight.201 Furthermore, as this Note has argued earlier, the Supreme
Court has deemed integration for integration's sake to be an insuffi
ciently weighty government interest to overcome offending other con
stitutional norms;202 using racial classifications to accomplish integra
tion deeply offends the Court's norm of "classificationism."203
When a district is faced with rampant white flight in the wake of
school integration, however, race-classifying transfer policies may be
justified under Paradise's cost-benefit test. For instance, in Johnson v.
Board of Education of Chicago,204 the Court of Appeals for the Sev
enth Circuit upheld racial quotas voluntarily imposed by the Chicago
school system in an effort to stem white flight.205 In Johnson, black
students had been denied transfers to schools with large black popula
tions solely on the basis of their race; had they been white, they would
have been allowed to transfer.206 Applying strict scrutiny, the court
nevertheless upheld the plan due to the school board's compelling in
terest in arresting de facto segregation.207 The court relied heavily on

200. See supra notes 176-191 and accompanying text.
201. 480 U.S. at 171 (plurality opinion); see Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706 (considering the
Paradise factor of "the planned duration of the policy"); Brewer, 212 F.3d at 757 (Miner, J.,
dissenting) (urging application of this Paradise factor). Indeed, in Brewer, dissenting judge
Miner pointed out that despite the fact that Rochester's inter-district controlled choice plan
had been around for thirty-five years, it had not had "any apparent success in reducing racial
isolation." Id. at 757 (Miner, J., dissenting). The concentration of minority students in the
Rochester District increased from twenty-five percent in 1963 to about eighty percent in
1996-97, while the suburban districts reported an overall minority population of less than ten
percent (the controlled choice plan was adopted in 1965). See id. at 743.
But see Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19154, at
*46-47 (11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001) (concluding that the Paradise duration factor is less relevant
in the diversity context because "by definition, the goal of remedying past discrimination has
a logical end-point, the goal of exposing students to a diverse student body may not").
202. See supra notes 97-11 1 and accompanying text.
203. See cases cited supra note 30.
204. 604 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated mem., 449 U.S. 915 (1980).
205. See also Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 71011 (2d Cir. 1979); Higgins v. Bd. of Educ., 508 F2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974).
206. Johnson, 604 F.2d at 508.
207. Id. at 517.
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the bleak statistics of white flight in Chicago's public schools208 and in
its residential patterns.209 The startling demographic changes present
in Johnson help explain the holding and limit its general applicability.
A white flight exception · to the general prohibition of race
classifying schemes can be justified under Paradise because the bene
fits outweigh the costs. Although denying a student the chance to
transfer to another fungible school on the basis of race certainly im
poses some constitutional harm on an innocent third party, the costs of
such a plan are less than those present in the case of denying admis
sion to a magnet or selective school.210 In Paradise, the Court stressed
that the one-for-one promotion requirement did not deny any inno
cent third party an employment opportunity altogether,211 much like a
student denied a transfer to a fungible school is not denied a chance
for an education at a roughly comparable public school altogether.212
208. See id. at 510 (noting in particular that in three Chicago high schools in which no
action had been taken, white attendance dropped from 46.6% to 1.0%, 30.6% to 5.0%, and
36.2% to 6.6% from 1970 to 1975).
·

209. See id. at 516 (discussing the "accelerated change in residential occupancy from
white to black" in Chicago neighborhoods and concluding that "the Board may properly
consider the unpleasant realities of demographic change and the phenomenon of 'white
flight' ").
210. See cases cited supra note 170 and accompanying text
211. 480 U.S. at 182-83 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).
212. See Johnson, 604 F.2d at 518 (noting that a student denied his first choice of en
rollment is guaranteed "a viable opportunity to attend an integrated high school"); see also
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1239 (W.D.
Wash. 2001) (noting that under Seattle's enrollment plan that gives preferences to students
of certain races, "children of all races may attend at least one of the district's popular
schools").
Some have argued that a student denied enrollment at a selective or magnet school suf
fers a similarly lesser degree of constitutional harm for he is permitted to attend at least
some other school in the district. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 830 (Lipez, J., dis
senting) (noting that the denial of admission of the white plaintiff student to Boston Latin
"resembles denial of a promotion with retention of current job status" and is therefore not
sufficiently harmful to defeat the constitutionality of the district's racial preference plan).
While it is true that such a student is not denied an education altogether, just as the white
policemen in Paradise were not laid off, 480 U.S. at 182-83 (plurality opinion), the Paradise
Court also noted that a qualified white police officer's opportunity for promotion had only
been postponed by the plan, not foreclosed outright. Id. at 183 (plurality opinion). To the
contrary, a student denied admission to a magnet or selective school is likely to be perma
nently deprived of the chance to attend such a school. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 830
(Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that the white plaintiff, "unlike the non-promoted police offi
cers . . . will not have another chance to enter Boston Latin").
A white flight exception to a prohibition on the use of racial classifications in the magnet
and selective school contexts is also unwarranted because there is no additional benefit of
preventing residential segregation as there is in the fungible school context. Selective and
magnet schools have a district-wide geographic base, see supra note 121 and accompanying
text, whereas fungible schools draw their student populations from a m·ore narrow geo
graphic base (such as a neighborhood). Consequently, magnet and selective schools simply
present additional educational options to students, but do not "force" white students to at
tend school with blacks, and, therefore, do not trigger the sort of prejudice and hysteria that
can lead to white flight out of the district.
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More importantly, however, the government is asserting an inter
est greater than the mere attainment of an integrated student body,
which standing alone would not be sufficient to justify the use of racial
classifications.213 Rather, in a case like Johnson, the government is also
asserting an interest in combating the harmful effects of residential
white flight,214 and thereby seeking to promote what the Supreme
Court has recognized as the "important governmental objective" of
maintaining stable, racially integrated communities.215 Massive and
swift white flight, after all, can devastate a community, leading to im
poverished, crime-infested slums, constituting something akin to a
"social emergency."216

213. See supra notes 200-203 and accompanying text.
214. See Johnson, 604 F.2d at 516-17 (discussing the authority of school officials to re
spond to "the unpleasant realities of demographic change and the phenomenon of 'white
flight' ").
215. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1977) (declaring that
" [t]here can be no question about the importance of achieving" stable, racially integrated
housing as "th[e] Court has expressly recognized that substantial benefits flow to both whites
and blacks from interracial association and that Congress has made a strong national com
mitment to promote integrated housing"); see also Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491
F.2d 161 . 164-65 (7th Cir. 1974) (upholding a prohibition on for-sale signs in the wake of
white flight as " [i]t is clearly consistent with the Constitution . . . to pursue a policy of en
couraging stable integrated neighborhoods"). But see United States v. Starrett City Assocs.,
840 F.2d 1096, (2d Cir. 1988) (striking down under the Fair Housing Act a public housing
project's reliance on racial quotas to prevent white flight where such quotas were "inflexi
ble" and not "temporary in nature").
Although the Court in Linmark struck down a municipal ordinance prohibiting "for
sale" signs that had been justified as a tool to prevent white flight, the Court specifically
noted that the defendant town failed to present evidence that there was "a substantial inci
dence of panic selling by white homeowners." Linmark, 431 U.S. at 95. To the contrary, al
though the Johnson court did not specifically mention that Chicago had presented any evi
dence of "panic selling," the court seemed to be acutely aware that such a phenomenon had
been widespread in Chicago. See supra note 209; see also ADAM COHEN & ELIZABETH
TAYLOR, AMERICAN PHARAOH 220-22 (2000) (explaining the rampant residential white
flight fueled by panic selling in Chicago).
216. Even Justice Scalia, one of the most ardent opponents of any use of racial classifi
cations, has indicated that he would countenance the use of race in the case of a "social
emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb - for example, a prison
race riot." City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur
ring in the judgment). Although rampant white flight certainly does not rise to the level of
"imminent danger to life and limb," the Johnson court clearly considered the white flight at
issue to constitute a type of "social emergency." See Johnson, 604 F.2d at 516 (observing the
"accelerated change in residential occupancy from white to black" and the need for "stabi
liz[ation]").
For a description of the devastating effects of white flight on a community, see COHEN &
TAYLOR, supra note 215, at 220-22 (discussing how white flight "caused many stable work
ing-class neighborhoods to transform into slums" in Chicago). See generally WILLIAM
JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS (1997) (describing the endless cycle of inner
city poverty in the wake of white flight to the suburbs).
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Because school integration is often a factor in causing residential
white flight,217 a district may seek to ensure that some of its schools do
not tip too much toward one race, as Chicago did in Johnson, in order
to prevent the flight of whites to the suburbs.218 Alternative, race
neutral measures may be inadequate to prevent de facto segregation
until some sort of stabilization is achieved, as the Johnson court
noted.219 Consequently, a school district facing white flight may react
by adopting a strategy similar to that adopted by the Chicago School
Board in Johnson: allow for open enrollment among fungible schools
but place caps on the percentage of students of a particular race who
may transfer in or out of particular schools in order to maintain racial
balance.220
While schools may rely on racial classifications to combat white
flight, the Paradise criteria of "the necessity for the relief and . . . the
flexibility and duration of the relief" counsel against permitting a
school board to do so indefinitely; rather, the racial classifications
ought to be relied on only temporarily while they are necessary to sta
bilize residential patterns.221 Once residential patterns have stabilized,
school districts will be able to achieve integration through race-neutral
means, as Section 111.C will explain.222 Racial classifications, therefore,
can be relied on to prevent rapid residential segregation, but if and
when such segregation has occurred, the use of racial classifications is
no longer justified.223
217. See, e.g. , David J. Armor, White Flight and the Future of School Desegregation, in
School Desegregation 187, 196-97 (Waller G. Stephan & Joe R. Feagin eds., 1980) ("[T]he
fact that white loss is associated with desegregation in some instances is not in dispute.").
218. See id. (discussing how white flight often occurs when schools are composed of a
"substantial proportion" of black students and when "there is a significant shift in the racial
balance of schools").
219. See Johnson, 604 F.2d at 519 ("We are not persuaded . . . that these alternatives
offer a viable means of preventing de facto segregation . . . . ).
"

220. See id. at 507-08.
221. Compare Paradise v. United States, 480 U.S. at 183 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(noting that the approved race-classifying decree "is only temporary"), with Croson, 488
U.S. at 498 (expressing skepticism about any race-based program that is "essentially limitless
in . . . duration") and United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir.
1988) (noting that although combating white flight may be considered "a factor" in assessing
the constitutionality of a race-based program, "it cannot serve to justify attempts to maintain
integration . . . that are n[ot] temporary in nature").
222. See Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist , 212 F.3d 738, 757 (2d Cir. 2000)
(Miner, J., dissenting) (finding racial restrictions on an inter-district open enrollment plan to
be unnecessary given their thirty-five year existence, lack of apparent success in reducing
racial isolation, and the lack of exploration of race-neutral alternatives).
223. For a recent opinion taking an opposite view, see Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. I , 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2001), which up
held Seattle's voluntary integration plan that relied on racial classifications to integrate the
city's ten fungible high schools. The court noted that in addition to its asserted interest in
promoting diversity, the school board had an interest in "ameliorat(ing] the de facto effects
of residential segregation." Id. at 1237. The court found that without a scheme relying on
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In conclusion, school districts must generally avoid the use of racial
classifications in assigning students to nonselective schools. Although
racial classifications are almost always prohibited in the magnet school
context, school officials may rely on them in responding to white flight
when assigning students to fungible schools. In the absence of such ex
tenuating circumstances, however, fungible school assignment must be
race-neutral.
III. THE CON STITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVE OF RACE-CON SCIOU S
RACE-NEUTRALITY

Although Parts I and II argued that race-conscious measures that
rely on racial classifications are generally unconstitutional, this Part
explains why race-conscious race�neutral measures designed to further
the same end - racial integration - are constitutionally permissible.
In concluding that racial classifications are generally impermissible,
Parts I and II noted that school officials have at their disposal a variety
of race-neutral means to increase racial diversity within their
schools.224 As such, the government's interest in using racial classifica
tions to pursue integration is less compelling because there exist effec
tive race-neutral alternatives to accomplishing the same end.225 This
Part ·identifies and discusses a number of these effective race-neutral
measures in each of the educational contexts considered above. Sec
tion III.A examines race-neutral ways in which selective public schools
may increase racial diversity, such as through the use of socioeconomic
and geographic factors. Section IIl.B examines race-neutral options
available to magnet schools, including the use of economic and geo
graphic factors as well as restructured lotteries for admission. Section
IIl.C then examines race-neutral ways in which school districts may
achieve racially balanced student bodies in their fungible schools, in
cluding the old standby of busing in addition to more modern tech
niques.
The policies discussed throughout this Part have largely the same
intent as the race-classifying schemes condemned as unconstitutional
in Parts I and II: increasing racial diversity in the student body popula
tion. As such, they are race-conscious policies in that school boards
racial classifications, the city's "demographic distribution strongly suggests that were geog
raphy alone to determine school assignment, the · district would be highly segregated into
white and nonwhite schools." Id. As Section 111.C will demonstrate, the court was wrong to
conclude that the school district "must take race into account" in order to achieve integra
tion. Id. at 1238. Rather, were the district to rely on geography in ways different from the
way envisioned by the court (the court seems to have in mind a strict neighborhood-feeding
student assignment plan), it could achieve integration in a race-neutral manner. See infra
notes 311-314 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 1 12-114, 164, 200 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 1 12-114 and accompanying text.
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adopting them do so "conscious" of the fact that the schemes are in
tended to increase racial diversity.226 But they are race-neutral in that
no individual student is ever required to identify himself as a member
of a particular "race," nor is any school administrator ever forced to
certify whether such an identification is correct.227 Despite sharing the
same goal as race-classifying policies, race-conscious race-neutral poli
cies avoid the pitfall of offending the doctrine of "classificationism,"228
thereby saving them from constitutional infirmity.
One might object to the constitutionality of race-conscious race
neutral policies by noting that the Supreme Court has struck down
laws that are facially race-neutral when deemed to have a discrimina
tory purpose.229 A race-conscious race-neutral policy designed to in
crease minority enrollment in a limited-capacity selective school, for
instance, would have the inevitable effect of decreasing white enroll
ment and, therefore, could be considered to embody a discriminatory
purpose against whites. Because the Supreme Court appears to have
adopted a symmetrical view of Equal Protection analysis in Croson230
and A darand231 - i.e., policies that burden whites ought to be scruti
nized with the same care as those that burden minorities - such dis
crimination, even though cloaked in the guise of race-neutrality, is
perhaps unconstitutional.232
226. See Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, 62 F. Supp. 2d 247, 249 (D. Mass.
1999) (defining "race conscious" government action as that which merely "takes into ac
count the impact on minorities" as opposed to giving preference to members of one race
over another).
227. See, e.g., Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 742-43 (2d Cir.
2000) (noting that in West Irondequoit's race-classifying open enrollment program, "once
the applicant is met in person by a Program Administrator, a question may be raised as to
the student's race as a result of the student's name, manner of speech and phrasing, and the
personal appearance of the child as observed during an interview or orientation meet
ing"( quoting defendants (internal quotation marks omitted))).
228. See cases cited supra note 30 and accompanying text.
229. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976) (noting that "the necessary
discriminatory racial purpose [need not] be express or appear on the face of the statute," and
that, "[a] statute, otherwise neutral on its face," may yet be unconstitutional if discriminatory
(citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886))).
230. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1989) (plurality opin
ion) (rejecting notion that "race-conscious classifications designed to further remedial goals"
ought to be subject to anything less than strict scrutiny analysis (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at
535 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internalquotation marks omitted))).
231. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1996) ("With Croson, the
Court finally agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race
based action . . . . " (emphasis added)).
232. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993) [hereinafter Shaw J] (noting that the
rule that racial classifications are presumptively unconstitutional "applies as well to a classi
fication that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination"(quoting
Personnel Adm'n v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)));
Chapin Cimino, Comment, Class-Based Preferences in Affirmative Action Programs After
Miller v. Johnson: A Race-Neutral Option, or Subterfuge?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1289 (1997)
(arguing that race-neutral affirmative action amounts to unconstitutional "subterfuge").
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The Supreme Court itself, however, appears to have implicitly re
jected this symmetrical approach to the Equal Protection Clause for
review of race-neutral programs, as Professor Kim-Forde Mazrui has
observed.233 Rather, even while the Court struck down the use of racial
classifications in a program designed to increase opportunities for mi
nority-owned businesses in Croson, both Justice O'Connor's plurality
opinion and Justice Scalia's concurrence simultaneously endorsed
race-neutral efforts to accomplish the same goal.234 In this sense,
Croson followed the logic of Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in
Paradise, which expressed a preference for helping minorities through
methods that do not rely on racial classifications, allowing for racial
classifications only when race-neutral methods are likely to be ineffec
tive.235 Lower federal courts have likewise viewed race-conscious race
neutral programs approvingly, requiring government institutions to
consider them first before relying on racial classifications.236 ConseSomewhat surprisingly, the legal and political communities have largely failed to recog
nize even the possibility that race-conscious race-neutral policies might be unconstitutional.
See Forde-Mazn.�i, supra note 199, at 2334 ("Curiously, both sides of the affirmative action
debate in the political arena have generally failed to recognize the constitutional difficulties
inherent in race-neutral affirmative action and, moreover, so have the courts."); id. at 2349
(noting that "the implications of Croson and Adarand for race-neutral affirmative action
have gone largely unrecognized, even by strong opponents of existing affirmative action
programs" and "even courts invalidating affirmative action programs have generally failed
to acknowledge the constitutional difficulties inherent in race-neutral affirmative action").
Some, however, have objected to the constitutionality of race-conscious race-neutral
programs. The plaintiffs in Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, 62 F. Supp. 2d 247, 24950 (D. Mass. 1999) - parents of white Boston school-aged children - unsuccessfully chal
lenged the constitutionality of a student assignment plan that did not classify by race but was
simply "race conscious" - "official action that takes into account the impact on minorities."
See also Cimino, supra (using the Court's recent redistricting opinions to argue that race
conscious race-neutrality is an unconstitutional subterfuge).
233. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 199, at 2349-50.
234. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-10 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) ("Even in the
absence of evidence of discrimination, the city has at its disposal a whole array of race
neutral devices to increase the accessibility of city contracting opportunities to small entre
preneurs of all races . . . . [Such devices] would serve to increase the opportunities available
to minority business without classifying on the basis of race:"); id. at 526 (Scalia, J ., concur
ring in the judgment) (noting that a state may adopt a contracting policy designed to "make
it easier for those previously excluded by discrimination to enter the field," which "may well
have racially disproportionate impact," but is constitutionally permissible because it is "not
based on race"); id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[A]ny race-neutral re
medial program aimed at the disadvantaged as such will have a disproportionately beneficial
impact on blacks. Only such a program, and not one that operates on the basis of race, is in
accord with the letter and spirit of our Constitution."), discussed in Forde-Mazrui, supra
note 199, at 2349-50.
235. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (noting in striking down Richmond's minority set-aside
program that "there does not appear to have been any consideration of the use of race
neutral means to increase minority business participation in city contracting") (citing
Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.)).
236. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19154, at
*52-53 (11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001) ("[A] university defending a race-conscious admissions pol
icy must show that it has genuinely considered, and rejected as inadequate, race-neutral al
ternatives for creating student body diversity."); id. at *69 ("The requirement that govern-
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quently, the Court's dicta, and the statements of lower courts, seem to
allow for programs that have the effect of favoring minority groups so
long as they do not use racial classifications to achieve this preferential
treatment.
Of course, any race-neutral government program is presumptively
constitutional even if it disproportionately benefits or harms a par
ticular race, so perhaps the Court's intimation of approval for race
neutral programs that benefit minorities disproportionately is simply a
restatement of this view and nothing more.237 If so, then if a white
plaintiff were able to prove that a purpose to discriminate against
whites by helping minorities was a "motivating factor" behind the
government's action, such a program would be unconstitutionally dis
criminatory.238 Any attempt to peer into the collective mind of a legis
lature, city council, or school board, and distill a motive animating its
actions, however, is notoriously difficult.239 Furthermore, in all likeli
hood, any race-neutral program that benefits minorities will likely also

ment consider the efficacy of race-neutral alternatives to programs that allocate valuable
public benefits based on race is extremely important."); Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp. 2d
822, 870-71 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (noting the failure of the University of Michigan Law School's
administrators to consider race-neutral alternatives to increase minority enrollment); Forde
Mazrui, supra note 199, at 2350 (discussing Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 161 (4th Cir.
1994) and Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
237. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 at 241-42 (1996) ("[W]e have not held that a
law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pur
sue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater pro
portion of one race than of another.").
The mere fact that a race-neutral policy's nonracial factors correlate with race does not
necessarily render them discriminatory. See Hopwood I, 78 F.3d 932, 947 n.31 (5th Cir. 1996)
(noting that although "some factors such as economic or educational background of one's
parents may be somewhat correlated with race," "[t]his correlation . . . will not render the
use of the factor unconstitutional if it is not adopted for the purpose of discriminating on the
basis of race"). Furthermore, the mere foreseeability that nonracial classifications might
have disproportionate racial effects is not enough to prove unconstitutionality. See Feeney,
442 U.S. at 279 n.25 (upholding Massachusetts's veteran-preference hiring policy against a
gender-based equal protection challenge even though the disparate impact was "essentially
an unavoidable consequence" of the policy).
238. See Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977)
(noting that plaintiffs challenging race-neutral government action alleged to be discrimina
tory had the burden of proving "that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor").
239. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 558
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[I]t is virtually im
possible to determine the singular 'motive' of a collective legislative body. . . . ").
Proving that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor behind a legislative body's ac
tion is notoriously difficult. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 163, 1165 (1978) (arguing that because "behavior results from the in
teraction of a multitude of motives, and because racial attitudes often operate at the margin
of consciousness," there will almost always be an opportunity for the government to argue
that its "action was prompted by racially neutral considerations," particularly when the deci
sion has been made by a group, like a school board, rather than by a single individual; con
sequently, "a motive-centered doctrine of racial discrimination . . . places a 'very heavy bur
den' of persuasion" on the plaintiff (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967))).
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have legitimate non-race-conscious reasons for its adoption,240 so it is
possible that a reviewing court might find that while race
consciousness was a factor in the program's passage, it was not a "mo
tivating factor. "241
Assuming, however, that a plaintiff could demonstrate that an in
tent to help disadvantaged minorities was a "motivating factor" be
hind a race-neutral policy, such a policy would generally still be consti
tutional. In other words, while the Court has taken a symmetrical
approach to review of programs relying on racial classifications that
are designed to benefit minorities (eschewing the notion of "benign"
classifications and applying strict scrutiny to all) an asymmetrical ap
proach ought to apply to race-neutral measures - i.e., policies de
signed to help disadvantaged minorities that do not rely on racial clas
sifications should generally pass constitutional muster, whereas race
neutral policies passed with an intent to subordinate such minorities
should not.242 .
An asymmetrical approach to race-neutral policies is justified be
cause such policies do not implicate the primary concern pervading
the Court's "classificationist"243 jurisprudence: that racial classifica
tions are intrinsically dangerous and divisive, regardless of the end for
which they are used.244 Race-neutral policies do not implicate the ex240. For instance, in his Croson concurrence, Justice Scalia noted that "[i]n the particu
lar field of state contracting, for example, [a state] may adopt a preference for small busi
nesses, or even for new businesses," which may well have the incidental effect of dispropor
tionately benefiting minorities. 488 U.S. at 526. Such a preference would likely be motivated,
at least in part, by a desire to help small businessmen.
241. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 ("Rarely can it be said that a legislature or
administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a
single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one.");
M.cGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973) ("The search for legislative purpose is of
ten elusive enough, without a requirement that primacy be ascertained. Legislation is fre
quently multipurposed: the removal of even a 'subordinate' purpose may shift altogether the
consensus of legislative judgment supporting the statute." (citation omitted)); Karst, supra
note 239.
242. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Future of Affirmative Action: After Affirmative Ac
tion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1047-52 (1998) (explaining why race-neutral measures to in
crease diversity that have the incidental effect of burdening whites are constitutional). See
generally Forde-Mazrui, supra note 199 (arguing for such an asymmetrical approach when
race-neutral programs are designed to remedy past societal discrimination).
243. See text accompanying note 31.
244. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ("Distinctions between
citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality . . . . [R]acial discriminations are
in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited. . . . " (emphasis added)); Bakke v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. , 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) ("Racial and
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judi
cial examination." (emphasis added)); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (noting that racial classifi
cations are a "highly suspect tool" and that "[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger of
stigmatic harm"); Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) ("Racial classifications of any sort pose
the risk of lasting harm to our society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too
much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the by the color of their skin");
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pressive harm of dividing the populace into socially constructed
groups as racial classifications do.245 Although enacted with a race
conscious purpose, they do not perpetuate racial divisions in the law,
and therefore do not further delay the day when "race no longer mat
ters," a normative proposition embraced by the Court.246 Also signifiAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223 (1996) (expressing deep "skepticism"
toward the use of any racial classifications).
245. By "expressive harm," this Note refers to Professors Richard Pildes and Richard
Niemi's definition of a constitutional harm "that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed
through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material conse
quences the action brings about." Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms,
"Bizarre Districts, " and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw
v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-07 (1993). "Concern for expressive harm focuses on the
interpretive dimension of public action. . . . (They] are therefore, in general, social rather
than individual." Id. at 507.
The expressive harm of race-classifying government action, therefore, is that it reinforces
the notion that race matters and ought to be a salient factor in defining individuals in our
society. See Belk v. Charlotte-Meckleuburg Bd. of Educ., 233 F.3d 232, 309 (4th Cir. 2000)
(Traxler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Teaching young children that admis
sion to a specialized academic program with available seats is contingent on their race is in
deed pernicious . . . . ), vacated and reh'g en bane granted (4th Cir. 2001); Tito v. Arlington
County Sch. Bd., No. 97-540-A, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7932, at *18 n.9 (finding it "both un
fortunate and potentially pernicious that four year old children . . . categorize themselves
according to race in a manner that will follow them throughout their education and, often,
professional life," as such is "the first step in the state-sponsored perpetuation of an educa
tional system which continues to rely on racial distinctions"), affd in part and vacated in part
sub nom. Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed,
529 U.S. 1050 (2000); cf Steve Olson, The Genetic Archaeology of Race, ATL. MONTHLY,
Apr. 2001, at 69, 70 (noting that although genetic researchers "might claim that the genetic
differences they identify among groups have no biological significance . . . simply by dividing
human beings into categories - whether sub-Saharan Africans, Jews, Germans, or Austra
lian aborigines - (the researchers] reinforce the distinctions they would seek to minimize").
The expressive harm implicit in forcing people to identify themselves as members of cer
tain socially constructed racial or ethnic groups is compounded when the government re
serves the power to determine whether such self-identification is correct or not, as in Brewer.
See supra note 227 and accompanying text. In such a situation, the government has the un
seemly authority to correct how an individual chooses to define himself, and exerts the
power to force an individual to submit to social constructions of "racial" and "ethnic" groups
to which he might not subscribe. Such governmental authority is anathema to the Constitu
tion's protection of an individual's power of self-definition. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1 943) (majority opinion of Jackson, J.) ("If there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion . . . . ).
"

"

246. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 657 (noting that "the goal of a political system in which race no
longer matters" is "a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to
which the Nation continues to aspire"); Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (emphasizing the need for "eradicating from our society . . . the tendency - fatal
to a Nation such as ours - to classify and judge men and women on the basis of their coun
try of origin or the color of their skin").
As Professor Kim Forde-Mazrui has noted:
To the extent that race-neutral classifications have a racial message, it is that blacks and
whites who suffer from similar disadvantages share a common condition, while whites and
blacks who do not suffer such disadvantages share a relative privilege. Race is not, by the
terms of the classification, a common denominator. Rather, the classification finds com
monalities between members of different (and the same) races and finds differences between
persons of the same (and different) races. The classification, in other words, by its very si-
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cant is the fact that even the most ardent opponents of race-classifying
affirmative action have generally voiced no opposition to, and indeed
have actually voiced support for, the race-conscious race-neutral vari
ety.241
Because race-conscious race-neutral policies do not rely on the in
trinsically dangerous tool of racial classifications to accomplish their
otherwise legitimate ends,248 they are entitled to significant constitu
tional deference. However, that a race-neutral policy is designed to
help historically disadvantaged "minorities" is not in and of itself a le
gitimate end; indeed, it is theoretically possible that in a city where
traditional racial "minorities" constitute a majority of the population
and control the city government, a race-neutral policy designed to help
minorities may in fact be designed to subordinate whites in a way that
might offend constitutional principles of equal protection.249 Race-

Jenee on race, sends the message that "race does not matter," a normative proposition that
the Court and opponents of racial preferences purport to embrace.

Forde-Mazrui, supra note 199, at 2372.
247. See Jodi Wilgoren, New Law in Texas Preserves Racial Mix in State's Colleges, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1999, at Al ("Even the strongest opponents of racial preferences - both on
[the University of Texas] campus and around the country - have little criticism of the [race
neutral] top 10 percent rule . . . . "). In the Ho litigation, for instance, the Chinese-American
litigants consistently opposed the school's use of racial classifications in assigning students to
elite Lowell High, but indicated they would support any race-neutral alternative, no matter
how harmful to Chinese-American students. See Wagner, supra note 52, at Dl (citing the
attorney for the Chinese-American plaintiffs, David Levine, as stating that it's "fine" for a
school's "aim" to be to achieve "racial balance," as long as they don't "use race as the
means"); Kim, supra note 74, at Al ("We are perfectly fine with diversity as a goal, it's just a
matter of how you get there . . . . We think that if they put race in here, it violates the agree
ment and the Constitution." (quoting Levine)); Wagner, supra note 67, at Al ("We're not
saying that racial and ethnic diversity should not be a goal, but race should not be the means
by which to get there." (quoting Levine)). See also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 199, at 2349 &
n.75 (citing the many opponents of race-based affirmative action who nevertheless support
the race-neutral variety).
Interestingly, the lack of opposition to race-neutral affirmative action in the United
States does not seem to be shared by many in France, where a proposal akin to Texas's Ten
Percent Plan, see infra text accompanying notes 264-265, that calls for reserving spaces in
one of the country's elite universities for the top graduates of economically disadvantaged
high schools, has aroused the ire of the French press and many French academics. See
Suzanne Daley, Elite French College Tackles Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2001, at
A4.
248. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 199, at 2373 n.144 (concluding that "the principal
concern of the Justices who voted to invalidate the affirmative action program in Bakke was
its race-operative character rather than its motivating objectives").
249. See TRIBE, supra note 42, § 16-21, 1515 (describing the "antisubjugation" principle
of the Equal Protection Clause as one "which aims to break down legally created or legally
reenforced systems of subordination that treat some people as second-class citizens").
In Croson, after all, the Court thought it relevant that blacks constituted fifty percent of
the population of Richmond and held a majority of the city council. Consequently, " [t]he
concern that a political majority will more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority . . .
would seem to militate for, not against, the application of heightened judicial scrutiny in this
case." Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (citing John Hart Ely,
The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 739 n.58
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neutral policies enacted to further public school integration, however,
generally pose no such risk as they are not intended to subordinate a
particular race but rather are designed for the benefit of all students,
majority and minority, as Chief Justice Burger noted in his influential
Swann dictum,250 and as many lower courts have explained.251 Assum
ing that a school district is not merely using integration as a subter
fuge, therefore, to subordinate a particular race,252 a race-neutral plan
designed to increase public school integration is constitutional because
it avoids using the dangerous tool of racial classifications to accom
plish its otherwise legitimate goal.253
(1974) ("Of course it works both ways: a law that favors Blacks over Whites would be sus
pect if it were enacted by a predominantly Black legislature.")).
250. See supra text accompanying note 16.
251. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d
1224, 1236 (W.D. Wash. 2001) ("There is general agreement by both experts and the general
public that integration is a desirable policy goal mainly for the social benefit of increased
information and understanding about the cultural and social differences among the various
racial and ethnic groups." (quoting plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Armour)); Comfort ex rel.
Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 100 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 n.12 (D. Mass. 2000) (noting that the
pursuit of public school integration "reflects a concern that elementary school children get
used to being in classrooms with people different from themselves," as "the more diverse a
classroom is, the more likely students will learn that all people are different, no matter what
their color or ethnic background"; furthermore, integration is "a method to prevent the for
mation of stereotypes"); cf Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 822, 824 (E.D. Mich.
2000) (discussing, in the university context, the "solid evidence regarding the educational
benefits that flow from a racially and ethnically diverse student body" and concluding "that a
racially and ethnically diverse student body produces significant educational benefits").
252. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. , 137 F. Supp 2d at 1232-32 (noting that "(t]here
is no evidence, nor do plaintiffs claim, that the school board adopted [its integration] plan
for any other reason" than to benefit students of all colors). Even assuming the unlikely sce
nario that a school district were using integration as a subterfuge to subjugate a particular
race, proving this would be extremely difficult. See supra note 239.
253. Although this Note has argued that the Supreme Court has cast doubt on the value
of integration for integration's sake, it has done so in the context of arguing that integration
is not a sufficiently compelling justification to overcome the presumption against the use of
racial classifications. See supra Section l.B. Chief Justice Burger's Swann dictum is still rele
vant, however, in explaining why integration is a legitimate option for school officials to pur
sue so long as they do not offend any other constitutional norms. In Freeman, the independ
ent constitutional norm being offended by the school district's pursuit of integration was the
traditional local control of schools and the imperative to release schools from federal court
supervision at "the earliest practicable date." Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992).
Consequently, when no independent constitutional norm is being offended, as is the case
when race-neutral means are adopted, integration remains a viable option for school officials
to pursue.
At least one commentator has relied on the Court's recent redistricting cases to argue
against the constitutionality of race-conscious race-neutral policies in education. See
Cimino, supra note 232. Cimino has argued that the redistricting cases, beginning with Shaw
I, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and continuing with Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) ( "Shaw II"); and Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996), which invali
dated bizarrely shaped congressional districts used to create districts with a majority
minority population, cast doubt on the constitutionality of race-neutral affirmative action
plans. See Cimino, supra note 232, at 1291. In the redistricting cases, Cimino points out, the
majority-minority districts were facially race-neutral, yet the Court invalidated them anyway
because they were shown to have a racially motivated purpose. Id. at 1298. This violated the

August 2001]

A.

Integration Without Classification

2049

Race-Neutral A lternatives for Selective Schools

Numerous nonracial classifications are available to school officials
seeking to integrate selective schools better. Officials may incorporate
demographic characteristics into the admissions formula in an attempt
to increase minority representation, although the record of success in
this area is mixed. A more effective technique for achieving integra
tion is relying on geographic characteristics in the admissions calculus,
such as a student's neighborhood or feeding junior high school.
Three race-neutral demographic factors in particular may dispro
portionately benefit minorities underrepresented in selective schools:
socioeconomic status,254 whether English is the student's first or sec
ond language,255 and family status - i.e., whether the student is from a
"subterfuge principle" set forth in cases like Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74
(1886), which requires that any race-neutral state action motivated by a racial purpose be
subjected to strict scrutiny. Cimino, supra note 232, at 1298. Race-neutral affirmative action
plans act as a similarly unconstitutional subterfuge, Cimino contends. Id.
The redistricting cases can be distinguished from integration cases because of the end
being pursued in each instance. Although the majority-minority districts did not rely on the
dangerous tool of racial classifications to achieve their goal, the Court objected to the very
goal being pursued through race-neutral means: The bizarre-shaped districts could "be un
derstood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their
race." Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 657. The Court, therefore, condemned "[r]acial gerry-mandering"
as an illegitimate goal, for it "may balkanize us into competing factions; it threatens to carry
us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters." Id. Programs
designed to increase integration, however, implicate no such concerns of racial factionalism.
To the contrary, integration plans attempt to unify, rather than divide, the races. See Sulli
van, supra note 242, at 1051 (arguing that the redistricting cases do not spell constitutional
doom for race-neutral measures designed to increase diversity because whereas majority
minority districts "assume(d) that black voters vote monolithically . . . rais[ing] a specter of
group-based stereotyping," race-neutral affirmative action presents no such risks); Comfort,
100 F. Supp. 2d at 65 n.12 (noting that the pursuit of public school integration "reflects a
concern that elementary school children get used to being in classrooms with people differ
ent from themselves," as "the more diverse a classroom is, the more likely students will learn
that all people are different, no matter what their color or ethnic background"; furthermore,
integration is "a method to prevent the formation of stereotypes").
254. See U.S. Census Bureau, Income 1999 - Table B, http://www .census.gov/hhes/
income/income99/99tableb.htrnl (last revised Sept. 26, 2000) (indicating that the three-year
average median household incomes for 1997-1999 were $43,287 for non-Hispanic whites and
$48,614 for Asians as compared to $26,608 for blacks, $29,110 for Hispanics, and $30,784 for
Native Americans); see also Rebekah Denn, The New Face of School Integration: Board De
bates Assigning Students on Basis of Socioeconomic Background Rather than Race, SEATILE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 17, 2000, at Bl (observing that "socioeconomic integration of
ten has the side effect of promoting racial integration . . . as poverty rates are often higher
among ethnic minorities") (citing Richard Kahlenberg, Century Foundation fellow). Indeed,
both the San Francisco and Arlington, Va., school boards attempted to use socioeconomic
status as a nonracial factor to increase diversity in certain schools. See Tuttle v. Arlington
County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S.
1050 (2000) (noting that "whether the applicant was from a low-income or special family
background" served as one factor in admissions to a magnet school); Guthrie, supra note 52
(noting that Lowell used a system of points that took economic hardship into account).
255. See Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 701 (noting that in its effort to construct an admissions pro
gram that relied less on race and more on nonracial factors in an effort to increase diversity
in its magnet schools, the Arlington School District used English-as-a-second-language
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single- or two-parent home.256 Although public schools generally do
not have the resources to engage in the kind of individualized diversity
determination required by Bakke,257 using these demographic charac
teristics is likely to be quite feasible, as it simply requires number
crunching, as opposed to the time-consuming and labor-intensive pro
cess necessary for qualitatively evaluating essays and recommenda
tions.258
status as one of its two nonracial selection criteria); Ryan Kim, S.F. Schools Downplay Race
Further in New Proposal, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 24, 1999, at Al (noting that in an attempt to
increase diversity in city schools San Francisco was considering taking language abilities into
account).
The use of language proficiency as a proxy for race may raise some constitutional prob
lems in that proficiency in a certain language may constitute one of the characteristics by
which an ethnic group defines itself. In Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), the
Court held that a prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes to dismiss prospective jurors who
spoke Spanish for the asserted reason that they might have difficulty accepting the transla
tor's rendition of Spanish-language testimony did not constitute a per se violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. The justification asserted was considered sufficiently legitimate
and race-neutral as not to warrant overturning the trial judge's finding of no constitutional
violation. Id. at 369. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy, writing for a plurality, noted without
deciding that, "[i]t may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that pro
ficiency in a particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race
under an equal protection analysis." Id. at 371. Consequently, were a school district to enact
a policy that favored native Spanish-speakers only, such a plan might be considered to em
ploy a racial or ethnic classification, thereby triggering strict scrutiny. But a plan that simply
favors all non-English speakers, like the one used by the Arlington School District, could
hardly be said to single out any single racial or ethnic group.
Although language-preference schemes may be successful in boosting Latino and Asian
representation, they are unlikely to help - and may even work against - African-American
applicants. Cf. Steven A. Holmes, Leveling the Playing Field, but for Whom?, N.Y. TIMES,
July l, 2001, § 4, at 6 (noting that " [t]he impressive increase among Hispanic and Asian stu
dents [at California's state universities] coincided with a decision by university officials . . . to
give more weight to the SAT-II test," which tests for foreign languages and has allowed chil
dren of immigrants to test well in Spanish, Chinese, and Korean, but "is doing little or noth
ing for African-Americans, the group affirmative action was designed for in the first place");
Daniel Golden, Language Test Gives Hispanic Students a Leg Up in California, WALL ST. J.,
June 26, 2001, at Al ("[T)he native-speaker advantage doesn't help African-Americans, for
whom affirmative action was originally intended. Moreover, it also tends to benefit Asian
American students, who are already well-represented in higher education.").
256. The most recent census statistics indicate that among white families with children
under eighteen years old, 77.3% are married, 5.3% are headed by a single adult male, and
17.3% are headed by a single adult female. For African-Americans, 42.4% are married,
4.6% are headed by a single male, and 53% are headed by a single female. Among
Hispanics, the numbers are 69.7% , 5.2%, and 25% . (No statistics were available for Asians
or Native Americans from this source.) See U.S. Census Bureau, Household and Family
Characteristics, March 1998 (Update) - Table 1 , http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/p20515u.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2001); Guthrie, supra note 52 (describing how San Francisco's
Lowell Academy gave bonus points to applicants from single parent families in an effort to
boost minority enrollment).
257. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
258. This assertion is supported by the fact that in the wake of court rulings prohibiting
the use of race as a factor in student assignment, both the San Francisco and. Arlington
school boards quickly introduced student assignment systems that took these demographic
characteristics into account. See supra notes 255-256. Lowell, in particular, apparently had
already been awarding extra points to students from low-income families before Ho. See
Guthrie, supra note 52. School officials already deal with parental income statistics in coor-
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The ability of nonracial demographic characteristics to ensure ra
cial diversity in selective schools, however, ought not to be over
stated.259 While such methods may ensure a higher level of racial di
versity than would exist if only grades or test scores were taken into
account, the case of San Francisco's Lowell High illustrates that it is
questionable whether they can ensure the same level of minority rep
resentation as a system that relies on racial classifications. In the wake
of Ho, Lowell implemented a system giving bonus points to applicants
coming from single-parent families, augmenting a system that already
took economic hardship into account, in an effort to boost Latino and
black enrollment.260 The new policy, however, actually increased white
and Chinese enrollment at the expense of black and Latino appli
cants.261
Of course, the effectiveness of using these characteristics in boost
ing the representation of certain minority groups will depend on how
much weight is given to each in the admissions process. School offi
cials will have to tinker with the weights assigned to each admissions
criterion in order to achieve a student body with which they are satis
fied both demographically and academically.262 Indeed, one option of
ficials may consider is whether to minimize or eliminate entirely the
use of standardized tests in the selective school admissions process, a
criterion that tends to help white and Asian applicants while hurting
black and Hispanic applicants.263
dinating the federal school lunch program. See 7 C.F.R. § 245.6 (2001) (describing proce
dures for the collection and verification of income statistics for school lunch purposes by
school officials).
259. Cf, e.g. , Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 452, 471 (1997) (concluding that affirmative action based on economic class is
"a poor substitute for race-based affirmative action" in the university context); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1913,
1947-51 (1996) (concluding that although "there is something to be gained from well
designed programs of economically based affirmative action," they are a "distant second
best" from the race-based variety in the university context).
260. See Guthrie, supra note 52.
261. See id.
262. See generally Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Ac
tion, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472 (1997) (explaining UCLA's experimentation with race-neutral
admissions criteria in an effort to increase minority representation in the wake of
California's passage of Proposition 209, which prohibited taking race into account in admis
sions decisions).
263. Cf Diana Jean Schemo, Head of U. of California Seeks to End SAT Use in Admis
sions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2001, at Al (discussing a proposal to make taking the SAT's op
tional for applicants to the University of California in order to "increase the number of black
and Hispanic students gaining admission" as the SAT's, "on which blacks and Hispanics
generally score lower than whites, have also come under severe criticism by those who con
tend they reflect and aggravate racial inequalities"); Jacques Steinberg, Most Colleges Are
Expected to Continue to Use the SA T, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2001, at A6 (noting that "[d]oing
away with the SAT's as a requirement would eliminate a measurement on which the per
formances of black and Hispanic students have trailed significantly behind white and Asian
students"); cf also Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 853 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (noting
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Relying on geography rather than, or in addition to, demographic
factors is likely to be the most effective method for selective public
schools to achieve racial diversity. In particular, school officials could
implement a small-scale version of the new race-neutral affirmative
action policies being employed, with much success, in Texas and
Florida. In response to the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Hopwood prohib
iting the use of race as a factor in university admissions, the Texas
legislature passed what is popularly known as the "Ten Percent Plan"
in an effort to increase minority enrollment.264 The Plan provides that
Texas students in the top ten percent of their graduating high school
classes shall be admitted automatically to any Texas state university
without consideration of their standardized test scores or any other
criteria.265 Although critics initially claimed that the Plan did little to
counteract the decrease in minority enrollment after the end of race
based affirmative action,266 recent statistics indicate that the plan has
actually increased minority enrollment at most of the state's selective
institutions relative to when race-based affirmative action was in
place.267 Indeed, even the most dogged defenders of race-based af
firmative action have acknowledged the success of the Ten Percent
Plan.268 Similarly, Florida, which also recently abandoned race-based
affirmative action in its college admissions, enacted the "One Florida"
plan, guaranteeing state university admission to the top twenty per
cent of graduating seniors of each state high school.269 Like the Texas
Ten Percent Plan, the race-neutral One Florida plan has led to an in
crease in minority enrollment in the state university system in its first
year.270 Indeed, in its recent opinion striking down the race-classifying
that "decreasing the emphasis for all applicants . . . on LSAT scores" is one race-neutral
technique the University of Michigan Law School might consider to boost underrepresented
minority admissions).
264. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a) (West Supp. 2001).
265. See id.
266. See. e.g., Danielle Holley & Delia Spencer, Note, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 245, 277 (1999) ("Despite its promise, the Ten Percent Plan has
failed to increase significantly the minority freshman enrollment at either UT-Austin or
A&M.").
267. See Wilgoren, supra note 247, at Al.
268. See Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Editorial, Credit Bush Doesn't Deserve, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2000, at A29 (describing the Texas Ten Percent Plan as "remarkably success
ful"); Wilgoren, supra note 267 (noting that "some of affirmative action's ardent advocates
favor the current program because it eliminates suspicion that students may have been ad
mitted solely on the basis of race").
269. See Rick Bragg, Editorial, Minority Enrollment Rises in Florida College System,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2000, at A18; Jeb Bush, Editorial, Better Than Affirmative, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2000, at A35.
270. See Bragg, supra note 269; Bush, supra note 269.
In the wake of Proposition 209's ban on racial preferences, California also adopted a set
aside for those graduating at the top of their high school classes. California, however,
adopted a much lower threshold of four percent, fearing that any higher percentage would
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affirmative action policy of the University of Georgia, Johnson v.
Board of Regents of the University of Georgia,271 the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit implicitly recognized the success of these
plans by noting that "guaranteeing admission to the top percentage of
graduating seniors in every high school in the state" may serve as an
"innovative strateg[y]" to create a more diverse student body.272
A conceptually similar plan could · be implemented in selective
public schools. A selective high school might, for instance, guarantee
admission to the top ten percent of each feeding junior high school in
the district. If the junior high schools are neighborhood schools that
are segregated due to patterns of residential segregation,273 such a plan
would operate much like the Texas and Florida plans by guaranteeing
slots at elite schools to students from mostly minority junior high
schools. Admittedly, for this plan to boost integration successfully, the
feeding junior high· schools would have to be substantially segre
gated,274 but such is the case in many·school districts.275
The San Francisco School Board actually considered such a policy
for its elite Lowell High School after Ho, but ultimately rejected it af
ter many parents complained.276 Critics objected on the grounds that
guaranteeing slots to children from under-performing middle schools
would "dismantle Lowell as a merit-based school."277 Whether such a
result in admitting inadequately prepared students to its universities. See Editorial, The Di
versity Project in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1999, at Al4. Nevertheless, California's four
percent guarantee has had limited success, increasing minority enrollment in its second-tier
colleges but failing to restore black and Latino representation at the flagship colleges to pre
Proposition 209 levels. See Editorial, After Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2000, at
A14.
271. 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19154 (11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001).
272. Id. at *68.
273. Indeed, residential segregation is quite common in the United States. In most of
the country's metropolitan areas, seventy-nine percent of whites and thirty-three percent of
blacks live exclusively among members of their own racial groups. See Lise Funderburg, In
tegration Anxiety, N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 7, 1999 (Magazine), at 84.
274. See Wilgoren, supra note 267 (noting that the success of Texas's Ten Percent Plan
"depends in part on the continuing segregation of the state's high schools").
275. Indeed, the very fact that San Francisco school officials were considering imple
menting such a plan in an effort to boost diversity indicates that the feeding junior high
schools were significantly racially segregated. See infra notes 276-277 and accompanying
text. Furthermore, merely by favoring students from public junior high schools over those
from private ones, a selective school might increase minority. enrollment as public junior
high schools often have a higher concentration of blacks and Hispanics than private junior
high schools within the district. See, e.g. , Daley, New Admission Options, supra note 85,
(noting that Boston was considering "giving Boston Public School pupils preference over
private school pupils in gaining admission to the city's elite prestigious exam schools" after
Wessmann for " [w)hile most Boston Public School students are black or Hispanic, more than
half the students at Boston Latin are white and 56 percent come from private schools").
276. See Ray Delgado, Parents Not Happy with Lowell Policy; Plan (o Take Highest
Ranking Middle School Students Draws Fire, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 1 , 1999, at A4.
277. See id. (quoting Marybeth Wallace of Parent Advocates for Youth).
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plan would actually dilute the academic quality of Lowell depends on
weighing the benefits of increased diversity278 against the costs of ad
mitting otherwise unqualified students on the basis of a middle-school
preference plan,279 a decision for the local school board to make.
Texas's experience with the Ten Percent Plan, however, illustrates that
academic quality is not necessarily sacrificed by efforts to increase di
versity as students admitted under the Plan have excelled academi
cally. 280
Furthermore, guaranteeing admission to students from feeding
middle schools, or granting preference to students from under
performing middle schools,281 need not hurt the academic quality of
selective schools if the feeding middle schools can be improved; In
deed, such a slot-guarantee program could provide a political incen
tive to invest more time and energy in improving the under
performing middle schools, as has happened with under-performing
high schools in Texas282 and Florida.283 Even without any middle school
preference or slot-guarantee, a decline in minority enrollment at selec
tive schools could still provide political incentives to invest more in
under-achieving, minority-majority schools by highlighting the educa
tional inequities among such schools.284 This is what has happened
with California's high schools since voters outlawed race-based af-

278. See supra notes 250-251 and accompanying text.
279. See Julian Guthrie, Lowell Admissions Vote Delayed; Race vs. Grades Controversy
Rages at Board Meeting, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 13, 1999, at Al (noting that the proposed
middle-school set-aside plan had been attacked "because the highest ranked students at an
academically inferior middle school may not be comparable to the top-ranked students at a
more rigorous middle school").
280. See Guinier & Torres, supra note 268 ("Contrary to the fears that they would be
unqualified, the 10 percenters exceeded expectations; their collective grade point average in
their first year of college was higher than the freshman average for all students before the
Hopwood decision.").
281. This is analogous to an additional admissions criterion of the One Florida pian that
gives a preference to students coming from under-performing public high schools. See Bush,
supra note 269.
282. See The Diversity Project in Texas, supra note 270, at A14 (observing that the Texas
Ten Percent Plan has led university administrators to become involved in public school re
form efforts that have "made a good bit of headway").
283. See Bush, supra note 269 (noting that in conjunction with the One Florida plan, the
state is "devoting unprecedented resources and attention to our lowest-performing primary
and secondary schools, where 85 percent of the students are African American,
Hispanic, or other minorities").
284. See Brent Staples, Editorial Observer, California Schools, After Affirmative Action,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1999, at A14 ("[T]he death of affirmative action has thrown a klieg
light onto educational inequality. With minority students who would once have graduated
from California's elite universities being shut out, political pressure is building for the state
to use its budgetary and regulatory powers to bring urban schools into line with those in
more affluent communities.").
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firmative action under Proposition 209 in 1996,285 and it appears to be
happening in San Francisco and Boston after Ho and Wessmann as
community leaders are focusing on improving the competitiveness of
minority applicants through academic achievement rather than racial
preferences.286
In a district with well-integrated feeding junior high schools, but
fairly segregated neighborhoods, the neighborhoods themselves,
rather than feeding schools, could serve as an important factor in ad
mission to selective schools. A certain number of slots could be allot
ted to students in each neighborhood, using a proxy like zip code.
Once again, owing to the widespread patterns of residential segrega
tion in America's urban communities,287 such a scheme would have the
effect of offering more slots to minority students.
The above proposals are merely suggestions, of course, as no single
policy will best suit a particular school district. Rather, it is, as Chief
Justice Burger noted in his Swann dictum, within the "broad discre
tionary powers" of local school officials "to formulate and implement"
any combination of these race-neutral proposals in the pursuit of
greater integration.288 The important point is that these race-neutral
alternatives do exist, and it is up to school officials to experiment with

285. See id; see generally James Traub, The Class of Prop. 209, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1999
(Magazine), at 44 (describing California's efforts to improve pre-college education in order
to boost minority enrollment in the state university system in the wake of Proposition 209's
prohibition of race-based affirmative action); Editorial, supra note 270 (describing the ef
forts of California, Texas, and Florida to increase the quality of education for minority stu
dents in the wake of abandoning race-based affirmative action).
One specific manifestation of this increased political pressure for better academic stan
dards was the lawsuit filed by the ACLU against the State of California seeking more ad
vanced placement courses for students in poorer, mostly black and Hispanic high schools.
See Staples, supra note 284. Even Ward Connerly, the California regent who was an outspo
ken foe of race-based affirmative action and a driving force behind Proposition 209, voiced
loud support for this effort. Id. Indeed, the effort has caught the attention of California law
makers who have considered drafting legislation to address this disparity. Id. Yet another
broader lawsuit was filed by the ACLU and other civil rights groups more recently alleging
vast disparities throughout all of California's public education system. See Todd S. Purdum,
Rights Groups Sue California Public Schools, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2000, at Al6.
286. See Venise Wagner, End of Race Decree Sparks Ideas to Aid Black Youths; S.F.
After-School Programs, Parent Involvement Touted, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 19, 1999, at Al
(noting that in the wake of Ho, African Americans in San Francisco began considering "in
creased parent involvement . . . establishing private and charter schools, bolstering neigh
borhood schools, asserting more political force and creating after-school programs"); Daley,
Exam School Data, supra note 85, at B3 (describing a $1.4 million initiative to improve pub
lic school education in Boston in an effort to increase minority enrollment).
287. See Funderburg, supra note 273, at 84.
288. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); see Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) ("No single tradition in public education is more deeply
rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has Jong been
thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public
schools and to quality of the educational process.").
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them if they wish to increase racial and ethnic diversity in selective
schools.289
B.

Race-Neutral A lternatives for Magnet Schools

Many of the proposals described in Section III.A could also assist
school districts seeking to integrate their magnet schools. In particular,
focusing on demographic and neighborhood characteristics is likely to
be most effective.290 Indeed, two of the proposals considered, but ulti
mately rejected, by the Arlington School Board before it enacted its
race-classifying scheme for magnet school integration, which was ulti
mately struck down by the Fourth Circuit in Tuttle, relied on neigh
borhood quotas to ensure integration.291
Another method of increasing diversity in magnet schools relies on
restructuring the parental choice system. The Arlington School
Board's unmanipulated parental choice system - simply allowing
parents who were interested in magnet school enrollment for their
children to enter an admissions lottery - resulted in an excess of
white applicants and a dearth of Latino and black applicants.292 Before
adopting the unmanipulated parental choice system, the Arlington
School Board also considered but ultimately rejected different lottery
structures:
[H]ave all names of an entering class in the county automatically put into
the lottery. All students are then selected at random and offered admis

sion until the class is full. Another method would be to offer randomly
selected families the opportunity to have their child's name placed in a
second lottery from which those students selected would be offered ad
mission. This method would require all families, even those not inter
ested in alternative schools, to make an active choice.293

289. Cf Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19154, at
*68-69 (11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001) (requiring universities to experiment with "innovative [race
neutral] strategies" to increase student body diversity).
290. See supra notes 254-258, 287 and accompanying text.
291. The first rejected proposal stated:
Assign a small geographic area to identified alternative schools as the home school for that
area, and fill the remaining spaces in the entering classes by means of an unweighted random
lottery from a self-selected applicant pool. The geographic area would presumably be se
lected so that its residents would pqsitively effect the diversity of the school.
Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 706 n.11. The other rejected neighbor
hood-based proposal stated:
Each neighborhood school would be allotted a certain number of slots at each alternative
school. The number of slots per school would be determined either by the percentage of that
school's population relative to [the magnet school's] studeni population or by the extent of
overcrowding at the school . . . .
Id.
292. See infra note 294 and accompanying text.
293. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706 n.11.
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By changing the student's default assignment, these proposals attempt
to overcome the inertia toward entering the magnet school l0ttery
that, for whatever reason, was more prevalent among blacks and
Hispanics than among whites and Asians in Tuttle.294 In a sense, this
approach echoes Green's recognition of the need for "affirmative
duty" to combat the self-segregation that can result from "freedom of
choice."295
As with selective schools, unitary school district officials are free to
experiment with any and all variations of these race-neutral options if
they deem magnet school diversity a worthy pedagogical goal. Be
cause magnet schools do not rely on a competitive admissions process,
one would expect school administrators to have more success in
achieving their desired racial balance through race-neutral means in
magnet schools than in selective schools, where, as acknowledged
above, doing so may be more difficult.296
C.

Race-Neutral A lternatives for Fungible Schools

Despite Section II.B's argument that plans relying on racial classi
fications in distributing students among ostensibly fungible schools
may sometimes be unconstitutional, a board of education may consti
tutionally consider race in deciding how to draw up the boundaries of
neighborhoods that will feed into each fungible school.297 The district
294. See id. tbl.4 (providing the ratio of countywide public school students to number of
magnet school applicants by race and ethnicity: blacks, 17%/8.6%; Hispanics, 31 %/10.8%;
whites, 41 %/67%; Asian/Pacific Islander, 10%/13.5%). The first proposal, described supra
note 291, also attempts to combat parental inertia by changing the default assignment.
295. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968); see also supra note 1 10 and ac
companying text.
296. See supra notes 259-261 and accompanying text.
297. As explained in note 253, supra, race-conscious school district drawing is funda
mentally different from race-conscious congressional-district gerrymandering in that it seeks
to integrate the races rather than balkanize them. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's most
recent racial gerrymandering opinion, Hunt v. Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. 1452 (2001), while pur
porting to maintain Shaw l's holding that a congressional district drawn for predominantly
racial reasons is unconstitutional, gave the state legislature much discretion in drawing dis
tricts by adopting a stringent evidentiary standard that must be met by plaintiffs to prove
predominant racial motivation. Id. at 1466.
Even assuming arguendo that Chapin Cimino is correct in arguing that the principles
from the redistricting cases cast doubt on the constitutionality of race-conscious race-neutral
methods to boost integration, see supra note 253, Hunt indicates that the Court will interfere
with the decisions of democratically elected officials only upon an extremely strong eviden
tiary showing of racial motivation - one that the Court found the plaintiffs failed to present
in Hunt. See Pamela S. Karlan, Editorial, The Court Finds Room for Racial Candor, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2001, at A15 (reading Hunt as indicating that the Court is perhaps less likely
now to interfere in cases where race plays a role in a state actor's decision); Linda
Greenhouse, Hints of a Change, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2001, at A12 (opining that Hunt might
indicate that the Court is looking to pull back from politically contentious racial issues and
let the political branches of government handle them). Consequently, in the school context,
plaintiffs would likely have similar difficulty proving that race was a predominant factor be
hind a school board's decision to draw attendance zones in a particular manner.
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may draw the borders of a school's feeding neighborhoods, and even
rely on busing to mix noncontiguous neighborhoods, in a race
conscious effort to maximize racial integration.298 Such a policy is still
race-neutral in that it avoids classifying students by race, and treats
similarly situated students of different races equally.299 For example, if
the district assigns students in neighborhood A (overwhelmingly
white) and neighborhood B (overwhelmingly black) to a certain
school, a black student in A and a white student in B will still be sent
to this school.
Such plans can be very effective, at least initially, in substantially
reducing the number of racially imbalanced schools in the district.300
Over time, however, particularly in geographically small urban school
districts surrounded by independent suburban districts, busing can ex
acerbate white flight, ultimately resulting in majority-minority urban
schools.301 Furthermore, busing students far from home has proved to
be politically unpopular,302 even among blacks, as many have advo
cated a return to neighborhood schools.303 Additionally, the success of
298. See, e.g. , Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 461 (1982) (discussing
approvingly "the Seattle Plan," "which ma(de] extensive use of busing and mandatory reas
signments" in order to "desegregate elementary schools by 'pairing' and 'triading' predomi
nantly minority with predominantly white attendance areas, and by basing student assign
ments on attendance zones rather than on race"); Bustop, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 439 U.S. 1380,
1382-83 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978) (denying an application for stay of a state court
order requiring a school district to desegregate based upon a lesser showing of discrimina
tion than that required by federal law because plaintiffs' "novel" argument that they have a
"federal right" to be free from the state's voluntary integration-promoting busing efforts was
without merit); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1971) (dis
cussing the famous "Finger plan" that relied on "zoning, pairing, and grouping" feeding
neighborhoods to achieve integration in Charlotte).
299. See Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S.' at 461 (noting that the "Seattle Plan" "bas[ es] stu
dent assignments on attendance zones rather than on race").
300. See, e.g. , id.
301. See Carolyn Barta, End of the Line, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 5, 1999, at lA
(describing the decline of busing in Boston and across the nation); Armor, supra note 217, at
196-97 (describing how white flight occurs most frequently in "central-city districts sur
rounded by easily accessible White suburbs (e.g., Boston)" and least frequently in "large
metropolitan school districts surrounded by minimally developed areas (e.g., Charlotte,
North Carolina)").
302. See, e.g., Barta, supra note 301 (describing the decline of busing in Boston and
across the nation); Robert Strauss, The Dilemma of Desegregation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2001, at § 14 (New Jersey), at 1 (describing how the otherwise self-described "progressive"
parents of Cherry Hill, N.J., have staunchly opposed a proposal to send children to elemen
tary schools farther from their homes).
303. See ALAN EHRENHALT, The Radical Idea of Neighborhood Schools, in ALAN
EHRENHALT, DEMOCRACY IN THE MIRROR: POLITICS, REFORM, AND REALITY IN
GRASSROOTS AMERICA 1 69 (1998) ("In many places, it is African Americans who are ask
ing whether years of court-ordered busing for racial balance have brought them anything as
valuable as the community solidarity that prevailed before it."); see also Editorial, A Chal
lenge for Schools Chief, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 10, 2000, at A24 (describing how black parents in
particular have "routinely complained" that San Francisco's crosstown busing of students
"stifled parental involvement"); Stafford, supra note 159.
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race-conscious geographic assignment patterns can be jeopardized
when such a system is complemented by school choice, which can of
ten lead to white parents opting out of schools with large minority
populations.304 Consequently, limiting choice by not allowing students
to opt out of the schools to which they are initially assigned may be es
sential to preserving racially integrated schools.305
Of course, proponents of racial classifications might point out that
limiting choice with a view to preservin.g integration is precisely what
race-classifying open enrollment policies attempt to do.306 Neverthe
less, it is not at all clear that race-classifying open enrollment policies
are any more effective in reducing racial isolation than those that do
not classify by race.307 If whites strongly prefer not to attend school
with minorities, one would expect them to express this preference
through resisting controlled choice by moving out of the district en
tirely ,308 and indeed this is what has happened in many school dis
tricts.309 Such demographic forces can likely be battled equally effec304. See Rosen, supra note 159, at 1 ("You can't reconcile choice with diversity, and
that's the tragedy.") (quoting Samuel lssacharoff, Columbia Law Professor); cf Ehrenhalt,
supra note 303, at 170 (noting that "the virtues of neighborhood schools and unlimited
choice . . . don't fit together").
305. Limited choice or no choice at all is actually the norm in American school districts.
See Elmore, supra note 165; see also Strauss, supra note 302 (describing how in New Jersey
"most school districts in the state have only one high school and many have only one middle
school"). But see Wilgoren, supra note 166 (describing how public school choice is growing
rapidly in American schools).
Of course, parents afraid of integration always have the constitutionally protected op
tion to pull their children out of the public schools altogether and enroll them in private
schools. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 519 (1925). Indeed, the private school
option often allows parents to choose a less integrated school without having to move to a
more distant suburb, and can serve as a significant impediment to integration. See, e.g. ,
Funderburg, supra note 273, at 85 (describing how an increasing number of mostly white
students in racially integrated Montclair, NJ., have been leaving the public schools for pri
vate and parochial schools).
306. See, e.g., Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 741-42 (describ
ing Rochester's race -classifying controlled choice program and its integration-promoting
goals).
307. For instance, in Brewer, dissenting Judge Miner pointed out that despite the fact
that Rochester's inter-district controlled choice plan had been around for thirty-five years, it
had not had "any apparent success in reducing racial isolation." Id. at 757 (Miner, J., dis
senting). Indeed, the concentration of minority students in the Rochester District increased
from twenty-five percent in 1963 to about eighty percent"in 1996-97, while the suburban dis
tricts reported an overall minority population of less than ten percent (the controlled choice
plan was adopted in 1965). See id. at 743.
308. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956) (presenting the now-classic "Tiebout Theory"). White flight to surround
ing districts with low minority populations is more likely to occur, of course, when the cen
'
tral-city district is surrounded by accessible white suburbs (as in Boston) than in the case of
large metropolitan school districts surrounded by minimally developed rural areas (as in
Charlotte, N.C.). See Armor, supra note 217, at 197.
309. See, e.g., Barta, supra note 301 (explaining how Boston's white public school stu
dent population declined from sixty percent in 1974 to fifteen percent today).
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tively (or, unfortunately, ineffectively) with race-neutral school choice
- allowing all students in urban school districts with high minority
populations to transfer to the largely white suburban schools - as
with race-classifying schemes.
In a school district with a high degree of residential segregation, of
ficials need not sacrifice school choice for integration. Rather, officials
could use neighborhood, rather than racial, classifications to limit
choice in an open enrollment plan to boost integration. For instance,
Seattle's controlled high school open enrollment plan, recently upheld
as constitutional by a federal district court in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,310 allows students
to choose which high school to attend but apportions slots for over
subscribed schools to students of the underrepresented race(s); i.e., if
more students wish to attend a predominantly white school than there
is capacity, the school will give underrepresented blacks students pref
erence in admission in an effort to achieve a racial composition that
reflects the overall population of the district.311
Although the court found that Seattle "must" rely on racial classi
fications to offer integrated schools,312 school officials could have used
the patterns of residential segregation throughout the city to their ad
vantage by adopting a residential, rather than racial, preference
scheme, under which students from the mostly minority southern part
of the district could be given preference to attend schools in the
mostly white northern part of the district. Relying on geography alone
would not, therefore, necessarily lead to highly segregated schools, as
predicted by the court,313 provided that the factor of geography was
used in this manner. Of course, it is possible that under the geography
preference scheme proposed, the races would tend toward self
segregation, with many more white than minority students from the
high-minority southern part of the district seeking to enroll in schools
in the northern part. But if the schools in the mostly white northern
part of the district really do offer more attractive programming and
facilities, as the court recognized,314 one would expect both white and
minority students to be attracted to them.
More importantly, if the geography preference scheme were de
signed to maximize the benefits of residential segregation, the neigh
borhoods given preference for attending the mostly white schools in
the northern part of the district would be those containing minimal
white populations, thereby reducing the possibility of self-segregation.
310. 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
311. See id. at 1226.
312. See id. at 1238.
313. See id. at 1237.
314. See id. at 1239.
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In sum, race-conscious race-neutral student assignment plans offer
a constitutional way for school officials to increase racial diversity
throughout the district. Relying on nonracial characteristics such as
geography and demographic criteria allow officials to integrate selec
tive, magnet, and fungible schools. Furthermore, magnet schools may
wish to consider altering the operation of their lotteries in a way that
attracts more underrepresented minority applicants. Finally, in the
fungible school context, school officials may draw attendance zones in
a race-conscious manner so as to maximize the racial diversity of stu
dent body populations.
CONCLUSION

As the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, the political branches
of local government, rather than the judicial branch of the federal
government, are best able to fashion and implement educational pol
icy.315 Nevertheless, in doing so, certain federal constitutional norms
must be observed. The constitutional norm of race-neutrality, or "clas
sificationism"316 - scrutinizing all programs relying on racial classifica
tions regardless of whether the classification is used in a benign or
malignant manner - requires that school officials generally avoid
classifying students by race in designing student assignment plans,
even where integration is the goal.
Nevertheless, within the confines of race-neutrality, school officials
retain substantial discretion to adopt measures that would boost racial
diversity among schools within their districts. While it is the opinion of
this Note's author that racial integration does indeed provide substan
tial pedagogical and societal benefits, school officials must weigh these
benefits against other, sometimes contradictory, benefits offered by
neighborhood schools, school choice, and elite, selective schools. The
conclusions they reach will vary from district to district, and school of
ficials will undoubtedly discover additional ways to achieve integration
without relying on the intrinsically dangerous tool of racial classifica
tions.

315. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) ("No single tradition in
public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local
autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern
and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process.").
316. See supra text accompanying note 31.

